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INTRODUCTION 
Sanctuary policies are considered among the most contentious 
feature of today’s immigration federalism debates, because they place 
federal and local policies in seeming opposition to one another.  As a 
result, the term “sanctuary” is not only highly contested and nuanced 
in the academic setting1 and political arena,2 but it has also become 
increasingly obscured through competing narratives in the 
immigration debate.  On January 25, 2017, President Trump attacked 
“sanctuary cities” by issuing an executive order that targeted 
 
 1.  See generally Annie Lai & Christopher N. Lasch, Crimmigration Resistance 
and the Case of Sanctuary City Defunding, 57 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 539 (2017) 
(connecting crimmigration’s critique as a defense strategy of sanctuary policies); 
Christopher N. Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities”, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1703 
(2018) (unpacking sanctuary policies’ constitutional legitimacy and importance for 
severing criminal law from immigration law enforcement) [hereinafter Lasch et al., 
Understanding “Sanctuary Cities”]; Christopher N. Lasch, Sanctuary Cities and Dog-
Whistle Politics, 42 NEW ENGLAND J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 159 (2016) 
(highlighting waves of sanctuary resistance and counter movements seeking to 
defund sanctuary jurisdictions) [hereinafter Lasch, Sanctuary Cities and Dog-Whistle 
Politics]; Hiroshi Motomura, Arguing About Sanctuary, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 435 
(2018) (unpacking sanctuary policies’ constitutional legitimacy and connection to 
local prerogatives); Rose Cuison Villazor & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, The New 
Sanctuary and Anti-Sanctuary Movements, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 459 (2018) 
(identifying differences between sanctuary and anti-sanctuary policies in relation to 
federal immigration law, and highlighting their emergence in public and private 
spaces); Rose Cuison Villazor & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Sanctuary Networks, 103 
MINN. L. REV. 1209 (2019) (highlighting different public and private spaces where 
sanctuary policies have emerged) [hereinafter Villazor & Gulasekaram, Sanctuary 
Networks]; Rose Cuison Villazor, “Sanctuary Cities” and Local Citizenship, 37 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 573 (2010) (connecting sanctuary policies to the notion of an 
inclusive local citizenship); Rose Cuison Villazor, What Is a Sanctuary, 61 SMU L. 
REV. 133 (2008) (exploring the discursive debates over the term sanctuary) 
[hereinafter Villazor, What Is a Sanctuary]. 
 2. See Josh Gerstein, Appeals Court Overturns Block on Texas Anti-Sanctuary 
Law, POLITICO (Mar. 13, 2018), http://politi.co/2DpCrIF [https://perma.cc/M2LJ-
FUGF] (highlighting how courts have legitimized both sanctuary and anti-sanctuary 
policies); Adriana Gomez Licon, Sessions Blasts Sanctuary Cities, Calls Miami 
‘Good’ Example, DAILY HERALD (Aug. 16, 2017), 
https://www.dailyherald.com/article/20170816/news/308169879 
[https://perma.cc/NJ2A-8MJP] (highlighting different understandings of sanctuary 
policies from a rule-of-law and federalism perspective); Jazmine Ulloa, How 
California’s Trust Act Shaped the Debate on the New ‘Sanctuary State’ Proposal, 
L.A. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-trust-act-
sanctuary-state-immigration-20170910-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/E7UX-
VKN4] (discussing how public officials and law enforcement hold different views of 
sanctuary policies). 
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jurisdictions for “willfully violat[ing] Federal law in an attempt to 
shield aliens from removal from the United States.”3 At the core of 
his anti-sanctuary order is the political narrative that “[sanctuary] 
jurisdictions have caused immeasurable harm to the American people 
and to the very fabric of our Republic.”4  When a federal judge in San 
Francisco issued a nationwide injunction temporarily blocking the 
executive order, President Trump’s administration responded: 
“[sanctuary] cities are engaged in the dangerous and unlawful 
nullification of Federal law in an attempt to erase our borders.”5 
Today, the term “sanctuary” in relation to sanctuary cities is 
“generally associated with the unlawful facilitation of the continued 
presence of unauthorized immigrants and their families in this 
country” — a narrative crafted by anti-immigrant groups like the 
Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR).6  The 
scholarly consensus, however, points to sanctuary policies’ many 
benefits, rather than their harms.7  Framing sanctuary policies as 
constitutionally legitimate remains a challenge, in part because of the 
category of “illegal alien” and the complex history of immigration 
federalism.8  President Trump’s political narratives and legal threats 
to defund cities have been effective precisely because they situate 
 
 3. Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799 (Jan. 25, 2017), 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/01/30/2017-02102/enhancing-public-
safety-in-the-interior-of-the-united-states [https://perma.cc/N5XB-28HM]. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Statement on 
Sanctuary Cities Ruling (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/statement-sanctuary-cities-ruling/ [https://perma.cc/H72J-JCEL]. 
 6. Villazor, What Is a Sanctuary, supra note 1, at 138. 
 7. See, e.g., Benjamin Gonzalez et al., The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, 
Crime, and Undocumented Immigration, 55 URB. AFF. REV. 3 (2017); Christopher J. 
Lyons et al., Neighborhood Immigration, Violence, and City-Level Immigrant 
Political Opportunities, 78 AM. SOC. REV. 604 (2013); Daniel E. Martínez et al., 
Providing Sanctuary or Fostering Crime? A Review of the Research on ‘Sanctuary 
Cities’ and Crime, 12 SOC. COMPASS 1 (2017); Ricardo D. Martínez-Schuldt & Daniel 
E. Martínez, Sanctuary Policies and City-Level Incidents of Violence, 1990 to 2010, 
JUST. Q. (2017); MARCEL ROMAN ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, A MESS IN TEXAS: 
THE DELETERIOUS EFFECTS OF SB4 ON PUBLIC TRUST IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 
(forthcoming 2019) (on file with author); TOM K. WONG, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, 
THE EFFECTS OF SANCTUARY POLICIES ON CRIME AND THE ECONOMY (Jan. 26, 2017), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/reports/2017/01/26/297366/the-
effects-of-sanctuary-policies-on-crime-and-the-economy/ [https://perma.cc/R27M-
RK3N] [hereinafter WONG, THE EFFECTS OF SANCTUARY POLICIES]. 
 8. See generally ALLAN COLBERN & S. KARTHICK RAMAKRISHNAN, STATE 
CITIZENSHIP: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES (forthcoming 
2020); PRATHEEPAN GULASEKARAM & S. KARTHICK RAMAKRISHNAN, THE NEW 
IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM (2015); MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL 
ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA (2004). 
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sanctuary policies as a resistance to federal law without guiding 
principles.9  State and local governments’ special interest in 
protecting their residents and the constitutional rights of all persons, 
regardless of their immigration status, are notably absent in the 
narrative, when they should be front-and-center.  Going beyond the 
Tenth Amendment’s anti-commandeering principle, rights-based 
guiding principles and state and local government interests 
substantiate the legitimacy of sanctuary policies. 
Shortly after President Trump took office and issued his anti-
sanctuary executive order, Mayor Carlos Gimenez repealed Miami-
Dade’s 2013 county jail sanctuary policy.10  This effectively allowed 
all new detainer requests issued by Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) to be honored and for suspected undocumented 
immigrants to be held longer than forty-eight hours, thereby violating 
an individual’s due process rights.11  As a result, 436 people in Miami-
Dade were turned over to ICE on detainer requests in 2017.12  This 
local repeal was a response to increased federal pressure.  On August 
4, 2017, acting Attorney General Alan Hanson sent Miami-Dade, 
among other sanctuary jurisdictions, a memo “warning [that] they 
must prove compliance with federal policies or lose crime-fighting 
 
 9. See Michael Kagan, What We Talk About When We Talk About Sanctuary 
Cities, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 391, 391–408 (2018). 
 10. See Patricia Mazzei, Miami-Dade Mayor Orders Jails to Comply with Trump 
Crackdown on “Sanctuary” Counties, MIAMI HERALD (Jan. 26, 2017), 
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-
dade/article128984759.html (last visited June 5, 2019); Press Release, Miami Dade 
Cty., Statement from Mayor Carlos A. Gimenez Regarding Changes to Federal 
Immigration Laws (Jan. 30, 2017), http://www.miamidade.gov/releases/2017-01-31-
mayor-statement.asp [https://perma.cc/J6D9-XZWX]. 
 11. Miami-Dade passed an anti-detainer policy on December 3, 2013, authorizing 
the Miami-Dade Corrections and Rehabilitation Department to honor detainer 
requests from ICE “only if the federal government agrees in writing to reimburse 
Miami-Dade County for any and all costs relating to compliance” and limited this to 
inmates being held that had “a Forcible Felony, as defined in Florida Statute section 
776.08” or a “pending charge of a non-bondable offense, as provided by Article I, 
Section 14 of the Florida Constitution.” Res. No. R-1008-13 (Miami-Dade Cty., Fla. 
2013); see Douglass Hanks, Miami-Dade Complied with Trump to Change Its 
‘Sanctuary’ Status. It Worked, MIAMI HERALD (Aug. 7, 2017), 
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-
dade/article165837497.html [https://perma.cc/4K3S-D2AC]. 
 12. Douglas Hanks, Sanctuary No More: Feds Seize 1 Immigration Detainee per 
Day from Miami-Dade Jails, MIAMI HERALD (Jan. 3, 2018), 
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-
dade/article192652294.html [https://perma.cc/5DLQ-W9HN]. 
2019] FORDHAM URB. L.J. 493 
grant money.”13  At the core of the letter was a carefully crafted 
narrative linking sanctuary policies to increased crime, citing 
progressive states like California and large cities like Chicago and 
New York.  Despite social science research showing that sanctuary 
policies are successful14 and that immigrants are less frequently 
engaged in criminal activity15 than citizens, when sanctuary policies 
are conservatively defined as unprincipled resistance to federal law, 
they become open to conflation with anti-immigrant frames and false 
notions of immigrant criminality. 
The federal government and its agencies have exclusive authority 
to pass and enforce immigration laws, but federal capacity to enforce 
its laws has always been limited.16  As a result, the federal 
government has formed partnerships with states and localities in 
order to expand its own capacity to identify and apprehend 
 
 13. Douglas Hanks, Trump Administration Warns Miami-Dade over ‘Sanctuary’ 
Compliance, MIAMI HERALD (Apr. 21, 2017), 
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-
dade/article146091594.html [https://perma.cc/R5YQ-WG9G]. 
 14. See supra note 7. 
 15. See generally Michael T. Light & Ty Miller, Does Undocumented 
Immigration Increase Violent Crime?, 56 CRIMINOLOGY 370 (2018); Thomas J. Miles 
& Adam B. Cox, Does Immigration Enforcement Reduce Crime? Evidence from 
Secure Communities, 57 J.L. & ECON. 937 (2014); Alex Nowrasteh, Criminal 
Immigrants in Texas: Illegal Immigrant Conviction and Arrest Rates for Homicide, 
Sex Crimes, Larceny, and Other Crimes, CATO INST. (Feb. 26, 2018), 
https://www.cato.org/publications/immigration-research-policy-brief/criminal-
immigrants-texas-illegal-immigrant [https://perma.cc/RVZ5-CT7Z]. 
 16. See GULASEKARAM & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 8, at 20 (providing a table 
of the major court cases establishing federal plenary power from 1875 to 1948). 
Federal plenary power over immigration law first emerged in 1849, and then 
continued to expand through the late 1800s and early 1900s.  Smith v. Turner struck 
down New York and Massachusetts’ state laws imposing an entry tax on alien 
passengers arriving from foreign ports as preempted by federal exclusivity over 
foreign commerce. 48 U.S. 283 (1849).  Chy Lung v. Freeman struck down 
California’s state law imposing an entry bond on Chinese immigrants, ruling that 
control over the admission of foreigners into the country was exclusively a federal 
responsibility. 92 U.S. 275 (1875). Chae Chan Ping v. United States declared that the 
U.S. Constitution provided for federal immigration control, describing such control 
as absolute, exclusive, and beyond judicial review. 130 U.S. 581 (1889). The 
distinction between federal immigration law and state/local alienage law began to 
emerge during this time as well. Yick Wo v. Hopkins struck down a San Francisco 
ordinance regulating laundry establishments in the city that discriminated against 
Chinese immigrants for violating the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection 
clause. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). Fong Yue Ting v. United States, by contrast, expanded 
federal power by allowing federal deportation of Chinese immigrants, even long-term 
residents. 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
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individuals for removal.17  Referring to President Trump’s campaign 
promise to deport two to three million immigrants, Anna Law 
explains, “to find, apprehend, legally process, incarcerate and return 
that many people to their home countries would require the 
cooperation of local law enforcement.”18  This is why the executive 
order not only targets sanctuary policies, but also makes interior 
enforcement partnerships a top priority and reinstitutes the Secure 
Communities (“S-Comm”) program.19  State and local governments 
that refuse to cooperate present a major obstacle to Trump’s anti-
immigrant agenda. 
Sanctuary policies form resistance to federal law that are built on 
deep constitutional grounds.  This Article contributes to the literature 
on sanctuary by proposing a new framework for organizing and 
characterizing the motivations behind, and goals of, sanctuary policies 
over time.  Part I explores and considers how four current approaches 
to understanding sanctuary — typological-legal, historical-legal, 
historical-moral and policy-data — are employed in areas of 
scholarship that are currently unbridged.  We argue that each of these 
 
 17. The Criminal Alien Program (CAP), created in the 1980s and continuing to be 
enforced today, makes identifying, arresting, and deporting noncitizens encountered 
in federal, state, and local prisons and jails a priority. See Lasch et al., Understanding 
“Sanctuary Cities”, supra note 1, at 1724. The Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigration Responsibility Act passed in 1996 created Section 287(g) (of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act), granting the Department of Homeland Security 
the ability to enter into agreements with local law enforcement agencies to deputize 
local officers to engage in immigration enforcement. See Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigration Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 287(g), 110 Stat. 3009, 
3009-563 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2012)); see also Lasch et al., Understanding 
“Sanctuary Cities”, supra note 1, at 1725–27. The biggest shift occurred from 2008 to 
2014, with the creation of the Secure Communities (S-Comm) program, which 
automatically shares the biometric fingerprint data of every person booked into a 
local jail with the Department of Homeland Security.  This enables ICE to issue 
detainer requests to local jails for immigrants identified by federal databases for 
residing in the country unlawfully. See Christopher N. Lasch, Rendition Resistance, 
92 N.C. L. REV. 149, 154 (2013); Christopher N. Lasch, Enforcing the Limits of the 
Executive’s Authority to Issue Immigration Detainers Immigration Law, 35 WILLIAM 
MITCHELL L. REV. 164, 173 (2008). 
 18. Anna O. Law, States Resisting Trump Deportation Plans Can Look to the 
Antebellum South, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 14, 2017), https://www.newsweek.com/states-
resisting-trump-deportation-antebellum-south-540727 [https://perma.cc/2DMU-
4Y9Y]. 
 19. S-Comm was temporarily suspended by DHS policy under President Obama 
from November 20, 2014 through January 25, 2017, and was reauthorized under 
President Trump’s executive order. See Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799 
(Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/01/30/2017-
02102/enhancing-public-safety-in-the-interior-of-the-united-states 
[https://perma.cc/N5XB-28HM]. 
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approaches have led to similar arguments in defense of sanctuary, as a 
constitutionally legitimate function of state and local governance.  
Part II proposes a new framework for organizing and analyzing the 
motivations behind, and goals of, sanctuary policies over three 
distinctive periods of development between  1979 and 2018.  Part III 
explains why this Article’s framework is able to ground a synthesis of 
the four separate approaches to show that sanctuary is much more 
than a resistance movement.  Our framework adds greater precision 
to understanding how social movements have evolved and re-
structured sanctuary policies to better resist the federal government 
and uphold constitutional rights.  It also focuses on how immigrant 
rights are being shaped by actors who engage in state and local policy-
making with constitutional constraints in mind. 
This Article argues that the narrative of sanctuary policies as 
violating federal law and challenging core American values, ignores 
their critical place in American history.  Since their origin in the 
1980s, sanctuary policies became less connected to the specific 
struggles of Central American refugees and assumed broader goals 
related to civil rights and immigrant rights that span the basic 
functions of state and local governance.  Sanctuary today provides a 
moral and constitutionally legitimate form of integration and 
protection with regard to undocumented residents. 
I. APPROACHES TO UNDERSTANDING SANCTUARY 
This Part briefly identifies and reviews four approaches that have 
been employed to understand sanctuary policies: typological-legal, 
historical-legal, historical-moral and policy-data.  The first approach 
focuses almost exclusively on unpacking the constitutional 
underpinnings and specific functions of sanctuary policies.  The 
second approach, by contrast, focuses on broader constitutional 
dynamics that shape federal preemption and state and local policy-
making in relation to immigration law.  The third and fourth 
approaches shift the focus away from the U.S. Constitution and 
towards a political understanding of how social movements shape 
sanctuary and how sanctuary policies, once they are passed, are 
linked to crime and economic outcomes. 
Each of the four approaches provides a unique understanding of 
sanctuary, but scholars have yet to bridge the gap and see the 
connection between these approaches.  This gap has prevented the 
development of a comprehensive understanding, forged from joining 
constitutional analysis, social movement analysis, and policy analysis 
in the context of federalism.  While the four approaches have 
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emerged separately from one another, they are connected through 
their shared understanding of sanctuary policies as substantively 
justified local prerogatives grounded in constitutional principles, 
moral values, and good policy.  This Article posits that a more holistic 
understanding of sanctuary policies emerges where the four 
approaches complement one another.  By analyzing policy trends 
over time, this Article integrates key features from all four 
approaches to explain the motivations behind, and goals of, sanctuary 
policies. 
A. Typological-Legal Approach 
Grounding sanctuary policies in a set of guiding constitutional 
principles, the typological-legal approach provides an important 
corrective to the framing of sanctuary policies as unlawful.20  
Christopher Lasch’s typology shows how sanctuary policies, rather 
than breaking the rule-of-law, serve as critical constitutional 
instruments often used to sever the connection between criminal law 
and immigration law.21  Referred to by scholars as “crimmigration,” 
the intersection between criminal law mechanisms (such as the use of 
local law enforcement and detention) and federal immigration law 
enforcement problematically casts a wider interior enforcement net 
for immigration violations that are civil and not criminal.  Immigrants 
in deportation proceedings as a result of crimmigration lack due 
process and procedural protections, making Lasch’s typology of 
sanctuary policies both about protecting the rights of all persons and 
creating resistance to immigration enforcement mechanisms that use 
state or local governing resources.22  The typology unpacks five areas 
 
 20. See, e.g., supra note 1. 
 21. Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities”, supra note 1. 
 22. See Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and 
Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 379 (2006). According to Juliet Stumpf, 
“[c]riminal law seeks to prevent and address harm to individuals and society from 
violence or fraud or evil motive,” whereas “[i]mmigration law determines who may 
cross the border and reside here, and who must leave.”  See generally Felicia Arriaga, 
Understanding Crimmigration: Implications for Racial and Ethnic Minorities Within 
the United States, 10 SOC. COMPASS, 805 (2016); Jennifer M. Chacon, Managing 
Migration through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135, 805–06 (2009) 
(explaining “crimmigration” and its historical  development and why it is important); 
César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Creating Crimmigration, 2013 BYU L. REV. 
1457 (2013) (analyzing the development of crimmigration law); Stephen H. 
Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of 
Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469 (2007)  (examining the 
convergence of criminal justice  and immigration control); Hiroshi Motomura, The 
Discretion that Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, 
2019] FORDHAM URB. L.J. 497 
in local law enforcement agencies’ formal and informal rules that 
create local sanctuary: 
(1) barring investigation of civil and criminal immigration violations 
by local law enforcement, (2) limiting compliance with immigration 
detainers and immigration warrants, (3) refusing U.S. Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) access to local jails, (4) limiting 
local law enforcement’s disclosure of sensitive information, and (5) 
precluding local participation in joint operations with federal 
immigration enforcement.23 
Localities enacting these five types of policies generally seek to 
“preserve local sovereignty, define local priorities, and enhance 
community trust in law enforcement.”24  These local prerogatives in 
policing and community trust are deeply rooted in constitutional 
rights, including Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which protects 
individuals from illegal searches and stops and from arrests without 
probable cause.25 
Addressing the constitutional substance of local prerogatives 
through a typology approach offers a critical counter-narrative to 
anti-immigrant positions, which rely on framing sanctuary policies as 
local resistance to federal law that demeans the rule-of-law.26  Lasch’s 
 
and the Civil-Criminal Line, 32 IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 167 (2011) (examining 
how immigration federalism is affected by the relationship between criminal law and 
immigration law). 
 23. Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities”, supra note 1, at 1707. 
 24. Id. at 1709. 
 25. See Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634 (3d Cir. 2014) (applying the Fourth 
Amendment protection of arrests without probable cause); Miranda-Olivares v. 
Clackamas County, No. 3:12-CV-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014) 
(applying the Fourth Amendment protection of arrests without probable cause); see 
infra Section I.C.  See generally Christopher N. Lasch, Federal Immigration 
Detainers After Arizona v. United States, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 629 (2013) 
[hereinafter Federal Immigration Detainers After Arizona]. 
 26. When signing Texas’s anti-sanctuary state law (S.B. 4) in 2017, Texas 
Governor Gregg Abbot argued that pro-sanctuary policies demeaned the rule-of-law, 
led to higher rates of crime (without evidence), and referred to the case of Kate 
Steinle, who was shot and killed by an undocumented immigrant in San Francisco, 
California (a sanctuary city). Patrick Svitek, Texas Gov. Greg Abbott Signs 
‘Sanctuary Cities’ Bill into Law, TEX. TRIB. (May 7, 2017, 8:00 PM), 
https://www.texastribune.org/2017/05/07/abbott-signs-sanctuary-cities-bill/ 
[https://perma.cc/7BT2-FJE5]. Immediately after the tragic death of Steinle, the 
Republican-controlled House passed the “Enforce the Law for Sanctuary Cities Act” 
(H.R. 3009), which would have denied federal funding to cities that refuse to report 
detained immigrants, also known as “sanctuary cities.” H.R. 3009, 114th Cong. (1st 
Sess. 2017), https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/3009 
[https://perma.cc/NW7F-TTWS]. See generally Lasch, Sanctuary Cities and Dog-
Whistle Politics, supra note 1 (highlighting multiple legislative attempts in Congress 
to defund sanctuary jurisdictions). 
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typology reveals how sanctuary is a legitimate policy means of 
upholding the U.S. Constitution.  Importantly, the constitutional 
roots anchoring sanctuary policies are not exclusive to Tenth 
Amendment anti-commandeering concerns.27  Annie Lai and 
Christopher Lasch make this point very clear, explaining that 
President Trump’s executive order and federal funding of local law 
enforcement raise much deeper constitutional concerns over the use 
of criminal law to enforce immigration law.28  They explain, “contact 
with criminal justice system actors serves as an entry point to a jail-to-
deportation pipeline” that has led state and local governments to 
passing some form of sanctuary policy in order “to protect the civil 
and constitutional rights of [their] residents.”29 
A key feature of sanctuary policies is how they symbolically and 
legally insulate a group of people from the enforcement of federal 
law.  A report by the Immigrant Legal Resource Center identifies 
seven different county-level policies that limit local assistance by 
sheriffs and jails who often engage directly with ICE on immigration 
enforcement.30  Additionally, crimmigration analysis of sanctuary 
policies provides an important alternative frame that can help unlink 
immigrants with criminality.31  Even more powerful, the report’s 
analysis highlights constitutional intersections that provide direction 
for considering sanctuary policies beyond Tenth Amendment 
tensions between federal and local policymaking.32  The policies are 
also substantively grounded in the Fourth,33 Fifth,34 and Fourteenth35 
 
 27. See Federal Immigration Detainers After Arizona, supra note 25, at 698–700; 
Motomura, supra note 1, at 446–47; Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities”, 
supra note 1, at 1747–57. 
 28. See Lai & Lasch, supra note 1, at 557–83. 
 29. See id. at 545. 
 30. See generally LENA GRABER & NIKKI MARQUEZ, IMMIGRANT LEGAL 
RESOURCE CTR., SEARCHING FOR SANCTUARY: AN ANALYSIS OF AMERICA’S 
COUNTIES & THEIR VOLUNTARY ASSISTANCE WITH DEPORTATIONS (Dec. 2016), 
https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/sanctuary_report_final_1-min.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8PBK-Q2BC]. 
 31. See supra note 22. 
 32. See Lai & Lasch, supra note 1, at 542, 573–75. 
 33. See Motomura, supra note 1, at 449 (explaining that “the Fourth Amendment 
prohibits searches and seizures without a judicial warrant or probable cause to 
believe that a crime has occurred” and noting that “complying with an ICE request to 
extend detention would typically violate the U.S. Constitution”). See Lasch et al., 
Understanding “Sanctuary Cities,” supra note 1, 1732–33 (referencing court decisions 
and officials that suggest how local detentions based on detainer requests might 
violate Fourth Amendment due process rights). 
 34. See Motomura, supra note 1, at 446, n.36 (explaining that a “federal district 
court found that section 9(a) of the [Anti-Sanctuary Presidential] Executive Order 
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Amendments as fundamental protections for citizens and non-citizens 
alike.36  Sanctuary protections are not only for undocumented 
immigrants, but also for people of color and transgender individuals, 
which are all groups that have historically been subject to punitive 
policies, over policed, and excluded from having adequate federal 
protections.37 
Historical precedent confirms this trend.  For example, sanctuary 
was provided to runaway slaves by a Massachusetts law from the 
1850s, which forbade state and local officials from enforcing the 
federal fugitive slave law, making the removal of any black person 
from the state without court approval a crime and granting all blacks 
equal due process protections under state law.38  Civil rights have 
been subsequently employed in other contexts to frame sanctuary 
policies: When San Francisco, New York, and Chicago passed revised 
versions of their sanctuary ordinances in 1989, advocates began to 
assert that City of Refuge ordinances were part of a civil rights 
policy.39  Advocates brought city sanctuary policies in line with the 
principle “that all persons residing within the city and county have 
 
violates the Fifth Amendment’s procedural due process requirement and is void for 
vagueness”). 
 35. Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities”, supra note 1, at 1764–65 
(referencing how states and cities have modelled their anti-discrimination laws after 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause). 
 36. See COLBERN & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 8, at 98–110; Juliet Stumpf, The 
Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 
367, 390 (2006) (noting that criminal process rights are embodied in the Fourth, Fifth, 
and Sixth Amendments, while immigration proceedings are generally governed by 
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause). 
 37. Allan Colbern’s book manuscript traces the development of state and local 
sanctuary policies through American history, including those protecting: runaway 
slaves (1780–1860) from federal fugitive slave law, and Central American asylum 
seekers (1980–1997) and undocumented immigrants (2000–2018) from federal 
immigration law.  See generally Allan Colbern, Today’s Runaway Slaves: 
Unauthorized Immigrants in a Federalist Framework (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with author) [hereinafter, Colbern, Today’s Runaway Slaves]; see also Allan 
Colbern, The House Is Picking a Fight with ‘Sanctuary City’ Ordinances. How Is This 
Like the Fugitive Slave Laws?, WASH. POST (Aug. 13, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/08/13/the-house-is-
picking-a-fight-with-sanctuary-city-ordinances-how-is-this-like-the-fugitive-slave-
laws/ [https://perma.cc/6PAL-6L97]. 
 38. An Act to Protect the Rights and Liberties of the People of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Chap. 0498, (Mass. 1855), 
https://archives.lib.state.ma.us/bitstream/handle/2452/97312/1855acts0489.txt?sequenc
e=1&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/PT8W-DHME]. 
 39. Jennifer Ridgley, The Birth of a Sanctuary-City: A History of Governmental 
Sanctuary in San Francisco, in SANCTUARY PRACTICES IN INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES: MIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 225 (2012). 
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fundamental human, civil and constitutional rights.”40  Similarly, as 
recently as 2017, Santa Rosa’s sanctuary policy specifies “people of 
color, Muslims, LGBTQ people and people with disabilities” 
alongside immigrant residents.41  Sanctuary under this policy goes 
beyond resistance to federal immigration law and “calls upon all City 
residents and all City Departments and employees to speak out 
against acts of bullying, discrimination and hate violence and to stand 
up for those who are targeted for such acts.”42 
Hiroshi Motomura developed a typology that goes beyond local 
law enforcement to draw out two basic features of sanctuary policies: 
resistance to enforcement and integration of protected groups.43  
Rather than focusing exclusively on sanctuary policies, Motomura 
unpacks five categories in which sanctuary policies have been 
grounded within broader policy dynamics of immigration federalism: 
(1) structural limits on federal authority; (2) state and local 
prerogatives; (3) substantive limits on arrests and detention; (4) 
fairness, equity, and proportionality; and (5) transparency and non-
discrimination.  The first three categories unpack the legal 
foundations of sanctuary policies in American federalism.  The 
federal, state, and local governments are all bound — to varying 
extents — by the Constitution.  The interplay between the three is 
delineated by constitutional prescriptions.  For example, as 
Motomura explains, structural limits are placed on federal authority 
by the Tenth Amendment anti-commandeering doctrine and by the 
Spending Clause, both of which insulate states from federal 
mandates.44  Beyond structural limits found in federalism, separation 
of powers makes congressional legislation — not presidential 
executive orders — the appropriate vehicle for allowing federal grants 
to be conditioned on state or local government compliance with 
particular mandates.45 
 
 40. See id. (emphasis added). 
 41. See Res. 2017-017 (Santa Rosa City Council, Cal. 2017). 
 42. See id. 
 43. See Motomura, supra note 1, at 437–40. 
 44. See id. at 446. Motomura explains that, under the Tenth Amenment’s anti-
commandeering clause, the “federal government may not directly compel a state to 
enact a regulation or enforce a federal regulatory program, conscript state officers for 
that purpose, or prohibit a state from enacting laws.”  Id. Similarly, the Spending 
Clause, Motomura explains, limits the federal government from using “its control 
over the authorization and disbursement of funds to “coerce” states in their decision-
making.” Id. 
 45. See id. at 446 n.36 (providing a brief description of court cases that have 
uniformly held that the federal executive branch may not withhold federal funding to 
localities because the conditions were not authorized by federal legislation). 
2019] FORDHAM URB. L.J. 501 
Whereas the first category in Motomura’s typology insulates states 
and localities from federal enforcement, the second and third 
categories move away from the focus on federal-state relations and 
instead highlight the state-specific origins of sanctuary policies.46  
Beyond the Tenth Amendment, local prerogatives in the form of 
community policing or integration policies, and local concerns over 
the substantive limits on arrests and detentions raised by Fourth 
Amendment rights, are both legal foundations upon which sanctuary 
policies emerge.47  Meanwhile, state and local prerogatives point 
towards how state and local governments perform their basic 
governing responsibilities.48 
In direct contrast to the resistance-only understanding, 
Motomura’s fourth category establishes a progressive federalism49 
understanding of sanctuary policies as a state or local cushion to the 
harsh federal immigration system.50  This parallels the crimmigration 
approach,51 but with a different point of emphasis on how the 
national and local are connected.52  It also directly contrasts Kris 
Kobach’s “attrition through enforcement” approach to federalism, 
which encourages state and local governments to further restrict 
immigrant access and rights in order to make life conditions so harsh 
that immigrants opt to self-deport.53  Sanctuary policies increase local 
discretion in ways that can ease the harshness of the immigration 
system as a whole, not only by preventing state or local authorities 
 
 46. See id. at 445–48. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See id. 
 49. The term “progressive federalism” refers to the interconnection between 
local, state, and national government and policy that propels the national direction on 
rights and equality. See COLBERN & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 8, at 12–16 
(advancing the argument that progressive federalism, located in state or local level 
policies that advance equality and justice, can move the entire country forward in 
advancing the rights of immigrants and other marginalized populations); Heather K. 
Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism, DEMOCRACY J. (Spring 2012), 
https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/24/a-new-progressive-federalism/ 
[https://perma.cc/B445-5NMS]; see generally Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the 
New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 YALE L.J. 1889 (2014) (arguing that federalism 
is a tool for progress in national politics, national power, national policymaking, and 
national norms, where progressive state and local policies can go beyond policy 
diffusion from the bottom up, to also include pushing the nation forward by 
overcoming political gridlock, cultivating discourse and agenda setting, and diffusing 
policy up that leads to larger progress in national political development). 
 50. See Motomura, supra note 1, at 460–61. 
 51. See supra note 22. 
 52. See supra note 50. 
 53. See generally Kris W. Kobach, Attrition Through Enforcement: A Rational 
Approach to Illegal Immigration, 15 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 155 (2007). 
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and resources from enforcing federal immigration law, but also by 
facilitating immigrant access to local resources and participation in 
local institutions.  Motomura’s last category of non-discrimination 
adds that sanctuary policies have taken on an important 
contemporary role in preserving America’s core values in the rule of 
law.  Contemporary U.S. immigration law has replaced the past 
tradition of providing expansive rights to immigrants, who were once 
considered to be “Americans-in-waiting,” with a harsh system of 
interior enforcement that infringes on constitutional rights.54 
Some scholars have taken the typological-legal approach one step 
further: They have begun to consider how sanctuary policies might 
cumulate into more robust forms of protection.  Rose Cruison 
Villazor and Pratheepan Gulasekaram developed the concept of a 
“sanctuary network” to capture how state and local jurisdictions — 
like city governments, county courts, and universities — can enact 
sanctuary policies that, together, form robust networks of legal 
protections to insulate immigrants from federal enforcement of 
immigration law.55  This emergence of sanctuary networks across 
multiple levels of government and institutional spaces, and their 
capacity to insulate undocumented immigrants in more robust ways 
when paired together, adds new depth to their substantive 
foundation.  Many of the innovations in sanctuary’s location are 
emerging entirely outside of formal policy-making, including in both 
courts and schools. 
B. Historical-Legal Approach 
The historical-legal approach focuses on how federal preemption 
over immigration law shapes the role played by states and localities in 
regulating the lives of immigrants.  This is distinctive from the 
typological approach because it centers the analysis on federal 
preemption, rather than unpacking constitutional sources of tensions 
in federalism.  At the same time, the two approaches provide 
complementary conceptions of state and local government’s role in 
immigrant integration.  The typological approach provides a precise 
understanding of how sanctuary policies function to integrate 
immigrants, whereas the historical-legal provides broader 
 
 54. See Motomura, supra note 1, at 451–55 (building on his prior work); see also 
HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION 
AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (2006); HIROSHI MOTOMURA, 
IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW (2014). 
 55. See generally Villazor & Gulasekaram, Sanctuary Networks, supra note 1. 
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constitutional understanding of why state and local governance ought 
to be oriented around integration rather than restriction. 
Since the late 1800s, the federal government has gained plenary 
powers over U.S. immigration law, and scholars have examined state 
and local power to pass polices related to immigration and 
immigrants within the context of federal exclusivity.56  Alex 
Aleinikoff analyzes how the U.S Constitution sets up different 
national and local governing relations, with a focus on who can and 
cannot exclude immigrants.57  The plenary powers doctrine sets up 
exclusive federal control over immigration law, which Aleinikoff 
argues empowers only the federal government to restrict or exclude 
immigrants’ right to enter or stay in the country.58  Lacking this 
power, state and local governments, by contrast, are guided by a 
personhood framework that obligates them to providing immigrant 
residents similar rights to citizens.59  Scholars refer to “personhood” 
with the idea that all individuals possess basic human rights, 
regardless of how federal, state, or local governments shape these 
rights.60  Under the plenary power doctrine, federal immigration law 
is exempt from many of the obligations that personhood rights 
require, especially on questions of admission, exclusion, deportation, 
and naturalization.61  By contrast, states and localities are required to 
fully recognize personhood rights.62 
 
 56. See GULASEKARAM & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 8 (providing a brief 
history of this transition to federal exclusivity in immigration law that emerges from 
the 1870s to the 2000s). 
 57. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the 
Constitution, 7 CONST. COMMENT. 9 (1990) [hereinafter Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, 
Membership and the Constitution]; see generally T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, 
SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN 
CITIZENSHIP (2002). 
 58. Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, supra note 57, 
at 10–11. 
 59. Id. at 20–27. 
 60. LINDSEY N. KINGSTON, FULLY HUMAN: PERSONHOOD, CITIZENSHIP, AND 
RIGHTS 3 (2019) (referring to the United Nation’s 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR), which asserts that “recognition of the inherent dignity and 
of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the 
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,” lays the foundations for 
modern rights based on the concept of personhood). 
 61. See Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, supra note 
57, at 10–11 (arguing that “Congress acts essentially free from any constitutional 
limits when it defines the categories of aliens entitles to enter, designates categories 
of excludable aliens, establishes admissions and detention procedures at the border, 
mandates the deportation of aliens residing in the country, denies resident aliens 
benefits and federal employment, permits the interdiction on the high seas of aliens 
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Unlike the legal typologies developed by Lasch63 and Motomura64 
that address the deep federalism conflict raised by sanctuary policies, 
Aleinikoff’s reliance on plenary powers obscures these conflicts 
between levels of government rooted in the U.S. Constitution.65  The 
personhood framework is also problematic, especially with regard to 
sanctuary policies, because it draws from natural rights of all persons 
rather than specific constitutional language and protections.  As a 
result, Aleinikoff reveals tensions between plenary powers and 
personhood rights that miss the federalism conflict central to 
sanctuary policies. 
By contrast, Hiroshi Motomura and Linda Bosniak explore 
immigrant integration policy within a citizenship framework for 
understanding rights.66  This provides a different analytical lens for 
considering restrictive policies limited to the federal government 
under the plenary powers doctrine, with state and local governments 
obligated to uphold the constitutional rights of citizens and non-
citizens alike.  Highlighting the rationale applied in Plyler v. Doe, 
which invalidated the Texas statute allowing K-12 public schools to 
deny undocumented immigrant schoolchildren access or charge them 
tuition, Motomura shows the ways in which Fourteenth Amendment 
equal protection has been extended to undocumented immigrants.67  
Thus, constitutional safeguards serve to legitimate integration and 
sanctuary policies, while simultaneously establishing limits on what 
 
seeking to come to the United States, and defines classes of aliens ineligible for U.S. 
citizenship”). 
 62. Id. at 19 (referring to “a notion of fundamental human rights that protects 
individuals regardless of their status” outside of the federal immigration law context). 
 63. See Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities”, supra note 1. 
 64. See Motomura, supra note 1. 
 65. See Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, supra note 
57. 
 66. See generally LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF 
CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP (2006); MOTOMURA, supra note 54; Linda Bosniak, 
Ethical Territoriality and the Rights of Immigrants, 1 AMSTERDAM L. F. 1 (2008); 
Linda Bosniak, Constitutional Citizenship Through the Prism of Alienage, 63 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1285 (2002); Linda Bosniak, Universal Citizenship and the Problem of 
Alienage, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 373 (2000); Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 
7 IND. J.  GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447 (2000); Linda S. Bosniak, Immigrants, 
Preemption and Equality, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 179 (1994); Hiroshi Motomura, The 
Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive 
Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625 (1992); Michael Scaperlanda, Partial 
Membership: Aliens and the Constitutional Community, 81 IOWA L. REV. 707 (1995). 
 67. See MOTOMURA, supra note 54; see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
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states and localities can do to discriminate against and restrict 
immigrants’ rights and access public resources.68 
Linda Bosniak takes the logic of constitutional safeguards even 
further, arguing that no distinction should be made between citizens 
and non-citizens under state and local policy.69  The defining question 
here is “whether government treatment of aliens beyond the border 
broadly construed — beyond questions of admission, exclusion, 
deportation, and naturalization — is itself to be viewed as an incident 
or extension of the immigration power.”70  While Bosniak does not 
specifically address sanctuary policies, her broader treatment of state 
and local immigrant policy aligns with both the crimmigration analysis 
of Lai and Lasch and the sanctuary typology developed by 
Motomura.71  Immigration law, applied to the external border and in 
an outward-facing manner, should not overlap with state or local 
policies regulating the lives of residents. 
Once undocumented immigrants are residing in the country, 
federal immigration law is no longer exclusive, and it overlaps with 
state and local laws.  The Second Circuit, in City of New York v. 
United States, clarified the limits of sanctuary policies as a form of 
resistance to federal enforcement of immigration law.72  It held that 
states and localities could not directly prevent communication of 
information previously obtained about legal status to federal 
immigration officers, but it also preserved state and local power to 
not inquire about immigrant’s legal status (“don’t ask”) under the 
Tenth Amendment.73  Recent challenges to the constitutionality of 
sanctuary policies under President Trump are reviewed in the 
Conclusion of this Article. Today, City of New York v. United States 
remains the only limit on sanctuary resistance; states and localities 
cannot actively obstruct federal enforcement, but they can sever their 
connection from immigration enforcement entirely.74 
Beyond questions about the separation of power, the enforcement 
of federal immigration law by state and local jurisdictions produces 
 
 68. See MOTOMURA, supra note 54; see also GULASEKARAM & RAMAKRISHNAN, 
supra note 8. 
 69. See Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference that 
Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1058 (1994). 
 70. Id. at 1094. 
 71. See generally Lai & Lasch, supra note 1; Motomura, supra note 1, at 437–40; 
see also Section I.A. 
 72. See City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 73. See id. 
 74. See id. 
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constitutional violations against a range of rights of citizens and 
noncitizens.75  In Galarza v. Lehigh County, the Third Circuit held 
that states and localities are not required to imprison people based on 
ICE detainers.76  Since Lehigh County, Pennsylvania was free to 
disregard the ICE detainer, the ACLU interpreted the decision as 
suggesting that states and localities “shares in the responsibility for 
violating Galarza’s Fourth Amendment and due process rights.”77  
Following the case, the Lehigh County Board of Commissions ended 
its policy of imprisoning people on ICE detainers.78  In Miranda-
Olivares v. Clackamas County, the U.S. District Court of Oregon 
added that honoring ICE detainers without probable cause is a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.79 
Legal scholarship on immigration law, together with recent 
typology work on sanctuary policies, provides broader context to the 
constitutional questions raised when states and localities regulate 
undocumented immigrants.  The personhood framework is often 
disconnected from the federalism conflicts under the Constitution, 
because it envisions rights as being universal rather than bound to a 
specific level of government.  Section I.C. and Section II of this 
Article explore how church-based sanctuary declarations and refuge 
are rooted in moral (similar to personhood), rather than 
constitutional, foundations.  Unlike state and local government 
sanctuary policies, church-based sanctuary declarations are liable for 
violating federal immigration law and sanctuary workers have been 
prosecuted under Section 274 of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA) for “bringing in and harboring of aliens.”80  The moral origins 
of sanctuary policies by non-state actors still play a critical role, as 
churches become actors in spurring underground movements to avoid 
 
 75. See Lai & Lasch, supra note 1, at 543. 
 76. Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 639–45 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 77. Galarza v. Szalczyk, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/cases/immigrants-
rights/galarza-v-szalczyk [https://perma.cc/FN2N-MA44]. See Galarza, 745 F.3d at 
644–45. See also Lai & Lasch, supra note 1, at 547 (referencing the federal court 
decisions as “suggesting that jurisdictions that elected to hold people could be liable 
for violating their Fourth Amendment rights”). 
 78. See Res. 2014-36, 2014 (Lehigh Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, Pa. 2014); see also 
Colbern, Today’s Runaway Slaves, supra note 37, at 61 (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with author). 
 79. See Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas County, No. 3:12-CV-02317-ST, 2014 WL 
1414305, at *7–9 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014) (ruling that Clackamas county violated the 
Fourth Amendment by solely relying on the ICE detainer request to hold a 
noncitizen for two weeks). 
 80. See Villazor & Gulasekaram, Sanctuary Networks, supra note 1, at 1230. See 
infra Section II.A.2. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1) (2018). 
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federal prosecution, in expressing civil disobedience against federal 
policy, and in partnering with government officials to reform national, 
state, and local policies.81 
The typological- and historical-legal approaches reviewed in 
Sections I.A. and I.B. offer important clarity to the constitutional 
substance that legitimatize sanctuary policies.  This goes well beyond 
the Tenth Amendment’s separation of federal and state powers.  
States and localities are bound to uphold the Constitution’s provision 
of rights to citizens and non-citizens.  As a result, progressive states 
and localities can employ sanctuary policies as a mechanism for 
easing the harshness of the immigration system, sever the connection 
between criminal law and immigration law,82 and provide a more 
robust policy network to integrate immigrant residents, regardless of 
their legal status under federal law.  Grassroots activism adds moral 
depth to the constitutional safeguards of progressive policymaking, 
which together provide a powerful counter to the “resistance only” 
narrative.  Rather than focusing on the tensions between federal and 
state policy, they ground analysis of sanctuary policies in 
constitutional legitimacy and local prerogatives responding to specific 
demands within affected communities. 
C. Historical-Moral Approach 
The moral origins of sanctuary offer a powerful frame for 
contemporary debates around the protection of persecuted groups.  
Biblical, English common law, Greek, Roman, and Anglo-Saxon 
traditions all share in common the role of churches in providing a 
place of refuge to persons who were convicted of crimes and lacked 
legal protections for their defense under formal government 
policies.83  In the United States, public and private entities gave 
sanctuary to runaway slaves, Jews escaping the Holocaust, civil rights 
workers fleeing mob violence in the South, draft resisters during the 
 
 81. See Colbern, Today’s Runaway Slaves, supra note 37, at 25 (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author) (examining how churches in antebellum, Jim Crow, 
and contemporary America played a role in shaping activism in state and local 
government sanctuary movements). 
 82. See supra note 22 (reviewing crimmigration literature). 
 83. See Barbara Bezdek, Religious Outlaws: Narratives of Legality and the 
Politics of Citizen Interpretation, 62 TENN. L. REV. 899 (1995); Jorge L. Carro, 
Sanctuary: The Resurgence of an Age-Old Right or Dangerous Misinterpretation of 
an Abandoned Ancient Privilege, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 747 (1986); Douglas L. Colbert, 
The Motion in Limine: Trial Without Jury: A Government’s Weapon against the 
Sanctuary Movement, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 5, 38–48 (1986); Villazor, What Is a 
Sanctuary, supra note 1, at 138–39. 
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Vietnam War, Central American asylum seekers, and contemporary 
undocumented immigrants.84 
Despite this overlap between private and public spheres, 
scholarship on church movements remains largely disconnected from 
the constitutional analysis found in the first (typological-legal) and 
second approaches (historical-legal), and disconnected from the 
empirical analysis found in the fourth approach (policy-data).85  The 
focus of the historical-moral approach has been on moral claims 
rooted to human rights critiques of national sovereignty.  For 
example, Lane Van Ham connects churches to immigration activism, 
beginning with biblical calls for hospitality at the end of World War II 
to pressure the United States to admit displaced persons from 
Europe.86  Advancing a theory of political discourse rooted in the 
moral “appreciation of global poverty as an oppressive force that 
challenges assumptions about the regulation of national boundaries,” 
Ham’s analytical approach focuses on challenging national 
sovereignty on moral grounds.87  Much like the limits of Aleinikoff’s 
personhood framework, Ham’s analysis of the church movement is 
disconnected from constitutional and federalism concerns salient to 
the current sanctuary debate. 
The larger trend in the scholarship examining the 1980s Central 
American crisis connects social movements led by churches to 
national, rather than local, policy, with a focus on moral claims to 
refuge.88  Part II of this Article reveals how the church movement of 
 
 84. See Colbern, Today’s Runaway Slaves, supra note 37, at 25 (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author); Villazor, What Is a Sanctuary, supra note 1, at 138–
39; see generally ANN CRITTENDEN, SANCTUARY: A STORY OF AMERICAN 
CONSCIENCE AND THE LAW IN COLLISION (1st ed. 1988) (recounting the story of the 
Arizona sanctuary workers). 
 85. See CRITTENDEN, supra note 84, at 92–111; HILARY CUNNINGHAM, GOD AND 
CAESAR AT THE RIO GRANDE: SANCTUARY AND THE POLITICS OF RELIGION 84–202 
(1995); RENNY GOLDEN & MICHAEL MCCONNELL, SANCTUARY: THE NEW 
UNDERGROUND RAILROAD 63–94 (2d ed. 1986); see, e.g., GARY MACEOIN, 
SANCTUARY: A RESOURCE GUIDE FOR UNDERSTANDING AND PARTICIPATING IN THE 
CENTRAL AMERICAN REFUGEE STRUGGLE (Gary MacEoin ed., 1st ed. 1985); 
ROBERT TOMSHO, THE AMERICAN SANCTUARY MOVEMENT 93–111 (1987). 
 86. See Lane Van Ham, Sanctuary Revisited: Central American Refugee 
Assistance in the History of Church-Based Immigrant Advocacy, 10 POL. THEOLOGY 
621, 621–22 (2009). 
 87. See id. at 637. 
 88. See, e.g., MARIA CRISTINA GARCIA, SEEKING REFUGE: CENTRAL AMERICAN 
MIGRATION TO MEXICO, THE UNITED STATES, AND CANADA (1st ed. 2006); SUSAN 
BIBLER COUTIN, LEGALIZING MOVES: SALVADORAN IMMIGRANTS’ STRUGGLE FOR 
U.S. RESIDENCY 136–62 (2003). 
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the 1980s went beyond a moral appeal for national change by leading 
in policy activism at the national, state, and local levels. 
D. Policy-Data Approach 
Unlike the typological- and historical-legal approaches, the policy-
data approach turns away from constitutional analysis and instead, 
tracks and explains the proposal, passage and failure of sanctuary 
policies.  This method aligns more with the historical-moral approach, 
where analytical focus is placed on actors and organizations important 
to explaining the developing sanctuary movement.  While often 
disconnected from constitutional analysis, the policy-data approach 
offers a distinctive contribution to the shared understanding of 
sanctuary policies as substantively justified local prerogatives.  It 
provides a systematic way of identifying the causal effects of 
sanctuary policies on outcomes like crime.89  Thus far, one of the 
primary empirical contributions from policy-data approaches has 
been to show that sanctuary policies are indeed good for improving 
local trust with immigrant communities and achieving lower crime 
rates.90 
Benjamin Gonzalez, Loren Collingwood, and Stephen El-Khatib 
find no statistical difference in violent crime, rape, or property crime 
across sanctuary and non-sanctuary cities.91  Using a dataset compiled 
by the National Immigration Law Clinic, which contained fifty-four 
local jurisdictions’ sanctuary policies between 2002 and 2008,92 they 
 
 89. Scholars have also examined policy datasets to test theories of political 
behavior that offer an indirect (not direct) contribution to understanding sanctuary 
policies.  The focus of those studies is to understand race relations and how various 
racial groups respond to immigrant threat, with sanctuary policies providing a proxy 
for threat. See Jason P. Casellas & Sophia Jordán Wallace, Sanctuary Cities: Public 
Attitudes Toward Enforcement Collaboration Between Local Police and Federal 
Immigration Authorities, URB. AFF. REV., May 2018, at 1; Loren Collingwood & 
Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien, Public Opposition to Sanctuary Cities in Texas: 
Criminal Threat or Immigration Threat?, SOC. SCI. Q. (forthcoming); Kassra A. R. 
Oskooii et al., Partisan Attitudes Toward Sanctuary Cities: The Asymmetrical Effects 
of Political Knowledge, 46 POL. & POL’Y 951 (2018). 
 90. See Gonzalez et al., supra note 7, at 9; Lyons et al., supra note 7, at 604; 
WONG, THE EFFECTS OF SANCTUARY POLICIES, supra note 7, at 1. 
 91. They define sanctuary as a “city or police department that has passed a 
resolution or ordinance expressly forbidding city or law enforcement officials from 
inquiring into immigration status and/or cooperation with ICE.”  See Gonzalez et al., 
supra note 7, at 4. 
 92. See NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR., LAWS, RESOLUTIONS AND POLICIES INSTITUTED 
ACROSS THE U.S. LIMITING ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAWS BY STATE AND 
LOCAL AUTHORITIES (2008), http://www.ailadownloads.org/advo/NILC-
LocalLawsResolutionsAndPoliciesLimitingImmEnforcement.pdf 
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compared criminal activity between sanctuary and non-sanctuary 
jurisdictions, and found no statistical difference.93  Rather than 
tracking enacted policies and employing a matching strategy to 
compare sanctuary to non-sanctuary jurisdictions, as that study did, 
Tom Wong used data collected by Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) that provides a total count per county jurisdiction 
of local compliance with ICE detainer requests.94  That data allowed 
Wong to examine sanctuary policies’ effects by comparing counties 
that do not assist federal immigration enforcement officials from 
counties that comply with immigration detainer requests.95  Not only 
do sanctuary counties have lower crime rates, but they also have 
stronger economies than similarly situated pro-enforcement 
counties.96 
Policy-data is also used to construct datasets that combine pro- and 
anti-immigrant policies at the state and local level to measure the 
overall orientation of a state or locality towards undocumented 
immigrants. Huyen Pham and Pham Hoang Van developed the 
Immigrant Climate Index, which provides this type of general 
measure and combines sanctuary policies with other integrationist 
policies in order to identify broader shifts in a jurisdiction’s protective 
 
[https://perma.cc/93XX-LMGJ] [hereinafter LAWS, RESOLUTIONS, AND POLICIES]. 
For a discussion of how two categorically distinctive sanctuary policies emerge 
between 2001 and 2005 yet are often problematically conflated together into a single 
dataset, see also infra Section II. As we point out, this problem occurs with the 
National Immigration Law Clinic dataset, which is the primary dataset used by 
scholars examining sanctuary policies. 
 93. The fifty-four local jurisdictions in their dataset span twenty-one states, with a 
majority falling under states with pro-immigrant policies (thirteen of the policies are 
in California, and six of the policies are in Massachusetts).  To test their claims about 
criminal activity, they collect city-level data from the U.S. Census, including 
population size, age, gender, education, income, ethnicity, and citizenship status, that 
might influence criminal activity or the selection decision by a city to become a 
sanctuary city.  They then “genetically match” sanctuary policies in the same states to 
control for these variables and statistically test the differences between sanctuary and 
non-sanctuary jurisdictions on the matching variables, showing that there are no 
differences between the two. See Gonzalez et al., supra note 7, at 29. 
 94. Wong defines sanctuary counties “as counties that do not assist federal 
immigration enforcement officials by holding people beyond their release date on the 
basis of immigration detainers” and non-sanctuary counties as “those that comply 
with immigration detainer requests” based on this proxy.  The ICE dataset codes 
2,492 counties, 608 of which are defined by ICE as sanctuary jurisdictions according 
to their “Current Detainer/Notification Acceptance Status,” which Wong explains 
captures “92.2 percent of the total U.S. population and 95.3 percent of the total 
foreign-born population in the United States.” See WONG, THE EFFECTS OF 
SANCTUARY POLICIES, supra note 7, at 4. 
 95. See id. at 1. 
 96. See id. 
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inclusion or punitive exclusion of undocumented immigrants.97  This 
use of policy-data parallels the network typology developed by 
Villazor and Gulasekaram,98 but provides an even broader snapshot 
of the orientation each state and locality have towards undocumented 
immigrants by including all integration and sanctuary policies 
together.99 
Unlike the empirical works by Wong, and Gonzales, Collingwood, 
and El-Khatib, which focus on a causal relationship between 
sanctuary policy and crime, research designed to explain policy 
development can theorize causal mechanisms that disconnect 
sanctuary policies from their deeper constitutional foundations.  This 
happens when the mechanism mirrors the resistance only narrative.  
For example, Pham and Van argue that a “Trump Effect” explains 
the dramatic rise in protective states and local policies.100  However, 
arguing that the dramatic policy expansions made in 2017 were 
primarily driven by resistance to President Trump disconnects 
sanctuary policies from longer developments occurring in immigrant 
rights at the state and local levels, and places Tenth Amendment 
concerns front-and-center over the other constitutional concerns 
directly related to immigrant rights.  This disconnection from 
immigrant rights results in a hollow understanding of sanctuary 
policies.  Policy development explanations, like the legal typologies 
developed by Motomura,101 and Lasch, Chan, Eagly, Haynes, Lai, 
McCormick, and Stumpf,102 are more effective as a counter to the 
resistance only critique when they are historically and constitutionally 
grounded. 
II. SANCTUARY POLICY DEVELOPMENT 
This Part develops a periodization scheme to make sense of the 
origin and spread of sanctuary policies using an original dataset with 
more than 800 sanctuary policies.103  To reveal finer-grained 
 
 97. See Huyen Pham & Pham Hoang Van, Subfederal Immigration Regulation 
and the Trump Effect, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019); see also infra Section 
II. 
 98. Villazor & Gulasekaram, Sanctuary Networks, supra note 1. 
 99. Pham & Van, supra note 97. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Motomura, Arguing About Sanctuary, supra note 1. 
 102. See Lasch et al., Understanding “Sancutary Cities”, supra note 1. 
 103. See Colbern, Today’s Runaway Slaves, supra note 37 (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author); Allan Colbern, Sanctuary Policy Dataset (2019) 
(on file with author). To create our original dataset, we merged four existing 
databases that trace sanctuary policy enactments and conducted online research using 
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constitutional and federalism features, we place sanctuary policies 
into temporal categories, like the legal typologies,104 from 1979 to 
2018.105  Our policy data focuses only on formally enacted sanctuary 
policies, similar to Gonzales, Collingwood, and El-Khatib’s dataset,106 
but is constructed with different analytical goals.  Their methodology 
treats all sanctuary policies enacted from 2002 to 2008 as homogenous 
in order to test for a causal effect on crime,107 whereas our dataset is 
employed in this Article to reveal policy variation from 1979 to 
2018.108  We only include policies that we are able to identify, 
catalogue, and qualitatively categorize into distinctive periods based 
on variations between policies.109 
Our approach focuses on patterns in sanctuary policy development 
over large spans of time.110  For example, a Trump effect emerges in 
2017.111  Qualitative analysis showing the connection between 
jurisdictions passing multiple policies before and after 2017, however, 
grounds the Trump effect as endogenous to the immigrant rights 
 
LexisNexis, ProQuest, and Google search engines to identify and download sanctuary 
policies.  For the four databases that were merged together, see Bryan Griffith & 
Jessica M. Vaughan, Maps: Sanctuary Cities, Counties, and States, CTR. IMMIGR. 
STUD. (last updated Apr. 16, 2019), https://cis.org/Map-Sanctuary-Cities-Counties-
and-States [https://perma.cc/QGU7-7FVD]; Lasch et al., supra note 1; LAWS, 
RESOLUTIONS, AND POLICIES, supra note 92; Resolutions and Ordinances Critical of 
the USA PATRIOT Act and Other Laws and Policies that Diminish Civil Liberties, 
OBSERVATORIO DE LEGISLACIÓN Y POLÍTICA MIGRATORIA (Oct. 26, 2004), 
http://observatoriocolef.org/_admin/documentos/Ordinances%20patriot%20act..pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G5FA-DWC3].  When merging the four existing datasets, we 
focused only on identifying policies enacted by governments and law enforcement 
agencies, included only accessible policies that could be downloaded and coded, and 
removed policies that were misclassified by the datasets as a sanctuary policy. 
 104. See, e.g., Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities”, supra note 1. 
 105. See Colbern, Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author). 
 106. See Gonzalez et al., supra note 7. 
 107. See id. at 33; see also Colbern, Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on 
file with author). 
 108. See Colbern, Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See Pham & Van, supra note 97, at 2. Sixty-eight local government sanctuary 
policies were enacted in 2017, which far exceeded all other years from 1979 to 2018 
by over forty-four policies (with twenty-four local government sanctuary policies 
enacted in 2006 being the second largest spread in a single year).  See Colbern, 
Today’s Runaway Slaves, supra note 37 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author); Colbern, Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author). 
More policies were enacted under President Trump, but these emerged primarily 
from progressive jurisdictions that had previously enacted sanctuary and other 
integration policies, well before the national elections in 2016. 
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movement occurring within states and localities.112  We argue that 
examining sanctuary policy development from historical and 
comparative vantage points ensures that theorized causal mechanisms 
are not simplified into a resistance-only explanation.113  Part II of this 
Article builds on immigration federalism scholarship to unpack how 
federalism dynamics, court decisions, political parties, and social 
movements combine together to shape sanctuary policy 
development.114 
Our policy development approach provides a new framework for 
thinking about how existing typologies link to state and local 
immigrant rights movements.  The two periods of immigration related 
sanctuary developments (1979–1995 and 1996–2018) fundamentally 
differ from sanctuary development period related to the USA 
PATRIOT Act (the “Patriot Act”) (2001–2005).115  The sanctuary 
movement first led by churches grew into an immigrant rights 
movement by the mid-1980s, with churches partnering with immigrant 
rights organizations and state and local officials to enact local and 
state sanctuary policies.116  An even more robust immigrant rights 
movement has emerged today that builds on many of the 
organizations that fought for immigrants in the 1990s and that began 
to gain legislative traction at the state and local levels after 2005.117  
The Patriot Act-focused second sanctuary period is mostly 
unconnected to the focus on immigration law in the first and third 
periods of development.118  Sections II.A., II.B., and II.C. of this 
Article place sanctuary policies into distinctive periods and in 
dialogue with immigration federalism scholarship to explain their 
development.119 
 
 112. See infra Section II.C. 
 113. See infra Part II. 
 114. See infra Part II.; see also COLBERN & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 8; 
GULASEKARAM & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 8; TAKING LOCAL CONTROL: 
IMMIGRATION POLICY ACTIVISM IN U.S. CITIES AND STATES (Monica W. Varsanyi 
ed., 2010). 
 115. See infra Sections II.A., II.B., and II.C. 
 116. Norma Stoltz Chinchilla et al., The Sanctuary Movement and Central 
American Activism in Los Angeles, 36 LATIN AM. PERSPECTIVES 101, 101–03 (2009). 
 117. See COLBERN & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 8; Allan Colbern & S. Karthick 
Ramakrishnan, Citizens of California: How the Golden State Went from Worst to 
First on Immigrant Rights, NEW POL. SCI., Apr. 2018, at 1, 2; S. Karthick 
Ramakrishnan & Allan Colbern, The California Package: Immigrant Integration and 
the Evolving Nature of State Citizenship, 6 POL’Y MATTERS, no. 3, Spring 2015, at 10 
[hereinafter Ramakrishnan & Colbern, The California Package]. 
 118. See infra Section II.B. 
 119. See infra Section II.A., II.B., and II.C. 
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Local governments and local law enforcement passed 806 sanctuary 
policies between 1979 and 2018.120  We merged four existing 
databases that trace sanctuary policy enactments along with 
additional policies through original research of online news article 
searches, which together were used to identify and catalogue all 
accessible sanctuary policies for qualitative coding using Nvivo 
software.121  Our coding of each sanctuary policy for this Article 
included determining: whether it was a resistance to immigration law 
or to the Patriot Act; which groups were being protected with a focus 
on United States citizens, all city residents, and specific immigrant 
sub-groups (e.g., asylum seekers, undocumented immigrants); and 
specific references to resisting or supporting federal and state 
policies.122 
Through this coding scheme, we are able to map the spread of 
three distinctive sanctuary policy developments: the first period 
(1979–1995) and third period (1996–2018) are temporally connected 
and similarly focused on resistance to immigration law; the second 
period (2001–2005) overlaps temporally with the third period, but is 
 
 120. 806 total sanctuary policies were enacted: 265 by local governments opposing 
immigration law, 180 by local law enforcement agencies opposing immigration law, 
and 361 by local governments opposing the USA Patriot Act.  See Colbern, Today’s 
Runaway Slaves, supra note 37 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); 
Colbern, Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author). 
 121. See Colbern, Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author). 
 122. Id. 
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focused on resistance to the Patriot Act (not immigration law).123  It 
is important to note that protections afforded to undocumented 
immigrants by 2018 are far more robust than those given in 2006, but 
they are part of the same period.124  The third period has three 
moments where major expansions in policy occur and evolves from 
prioritizing certain classes of undocumented immigrants to protecting 
all undocumented residents regardless of their criminal status.125  
Unpacking these evolutions in protection places our political 
development approach into conversation with already developed 
legal typologies.126 
A. Period 1: 1979–1995 Sanctuary from Immigration Law 
The Refugee Act of 1980 brought U.S. law in line with 
international human rights standards, specifically with the 1951 
United Nations Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees.127  The growing refugee crisis128 from Central 
 
 123. The temporal overlap of qualitatively distinctive sanctuary policy 
developments that we highlight has not yet been recognized by scholars using 
sanctuary policy-data.  Yet, it has important consequences for how sanctuary policies 
are examined, especially explaining their timing and sequencing over time.  For 
example, the Gonzalez dataset includes 2 sanctuary policies enacted in Alaska 
(Anchorage (2003) and Sitka (2003)) that resist the US Patriot Act, not immigration 
law.  The language used in the sanctuary policy of Anchorage focuses on the rights of 
citizens, not asylum seekers or undocumented immigrants (“the Anchorage 
Assembly reaffirms its support of the government of the United States of America in 
its campaign against terrorism, and affirms its commitment that the campaign not be 
waged at the expense of essential civil rights and liberties of citizens of this country 
contained in the United States Constitution and the Bill of Rights”).  See Res. No. 
2003-223 (Anchorage Mun. Assembly, Alaska 2003); Res. No. 03-886 (City of Sitka, 
Alaska 2003).  Our dataset places these two particular policies into the second period 
of development (2001-2005) as qualitatively distinct from immigrant rights 
movements and resistance to immigration law enforcement. See Colbern, Sanctuary 
Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author). 
 124. For further analysis on this particular period, see infra Section II.C. 
 125. See infra Section II.C. 
 126. See, e.g., Lai & Lasch, supra note 1; Villazor & Gulasekaram, Sanctuary 
Networks, supra note 1. For a greater discussion on these legal typologies, see also 
discussion supra Section I.A. 
 127. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified in 
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 
1967, 19 U.S.T 6223, 606 U.N.T.S 267 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967); G.A. Res. 429 
(V) (Dec. 14 1950). 
 128. The status of Central Americans and battle over asylum was politically 
animated, particularly over the distinction between refugees, asylum seekers, and 
unauthorized immigrants.  Refugees largely reside in camps outside U.S. territory 
(for example, World War II’s Displaced Persons or today’s Syrian refugees), where 
they are vetted for an extended period of time.  Asylees enter U.S. territory and seek 
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America in the early 1980s fit the newly enacted Refugee Act, which 
was modeled after the Convention’s “well-founded fear of 
persecution” standard.129  Despite this transformation in refugee 
policy, President Reagan’s foreign policy goals in opposition to leftist 
revolutionary movements specific to Central America caused the 
administration to officially consider Central Americans as economic 
migrants, who were unlawfully residing in the United States.130  
Denying Central American migrants recognition as refugees was a 
foreign policy choice made by the Reagan administration intended to 
mask the link between the United States foreign military aid and the 
civil wars in Central America.131  Throughout the 1980s, the U.S. 
government continued to deny political asylum to Central American 
applicants on the basis that they were fleeing economic stagnation 
and generalized conditions of violence, not political persecution.132 
 
asylum as entrants making their claims on U.S. soil.  Undocumented immigrants 
reside inside U.S. territory without authorization by the federal government.  
Throughout this Article, we use all three terms interchangeably to highlight the 
contentiousness of Central American’s status inside the U.S. that was at the heart of 
the sanctuary movement, but mostly refer to them as refugees.  Civil wars and 
violence in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras led to large-scale 
migration, beginning slowly from 1970 to 1979 with an average of 7834 migrants 
entering the United States per year, which grew dramatically in the 1980s and peaked 
with 136,000 migrants entering unlawfully in 1990, with an estimated 450,000 
undocumented migrants entering from 1980–1995.  See generally Douglas S. Massey, 
Children of Central American Turmoil and the U.S. Reform Impasse, SCHOLARS 
STRATEGY NETWORK (Aug. 2, 2014). 
 129. See Refugee Act of 1980 § 101 (describing the “fear of persecution” 
standard). 
 130. See GARCIA, supra note 88, at 84. 
 131. Revolutions led to violent civil wars that devastated the economic 
infrastructure and displaced millions.  In Nicaragua, the Sandinista Revolution of 
1979, a leftist movement that overthrew a repressive Anastasio Somoza government, 
sparked a civil war.  President Jimmy Carter sought to work with the Sandinista 
regime, but these efforts ended in 1981 when President Reagan aimed to overthrow 
the Sandinista regime by sending military aid and helping train the Contras, a right-
wing militant group.  The Reagan administration also funded right-wing leaders of El 
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to prevent leftist revolutions from spreading, 
exacerbating civil wars in these countries.  Central Americans in all four countries 
fled north to Mexico, the United States, and Canada to escape violence and economic 
catastrophe. See id. 
 132. A class action lawsuit was filed in 1981 on behalf of Salvadorans and 
Guatemalans detained at the INS facility at Los Fresnos, Texas, on the grounds that 
they were denied basic rights, including the right to legal counsel. The court issued an 
injunction in January 1982 prohibiting the INS from denying detainees their rights. 
See Nunez v. Boldin, 537 F. Supp. 578, 581 (S.D. Tex. 1982).  Salvadoran plaintiffs 
initiated a nationwide challenge to the adjudication process and claimed that they 
had fled political persecution in hopes of finding refuge in the United States and were 
denied procedural and substantive rights, including the INS failing to advise 
detainees of their rights to counsel, to apply for asylum, to have a hearing before 
2019] FORDHAM URB. L.J. 517 
The United States’ church sanctuary movement to harbor and aid 
refugees and asylum seekers emerged as a reaction to federal policy, 
which preserved a temporary protected status almost exclusively for 
migrants fleeing communist regimes or governments viewed as hostile 
to United States interests.133 On March 24, 1982, Southside 
Presbyterian Church in Tucson, Arizona and five churches in 
Berkeley, California, publicly declared themselves as sanctuaries for 
Central American refugees,134 who the federal government deemed 
unlawfully present, and led the country into a new sanctuary 
movement.135  Over the short span of a few years, the sanctuary 
movement developed into a national network of churches and 
synagogues that harbored and transported Central Americans, 
protecting them from deportation.136  An estimated forty-five church 
sanctuaries were declared in 1983, which grew to over three hundred 
by 1987.137 
1. Church Sanctuary Movement 
The church-based sanctuary movement originated in 1981 with Jim 
Corbett, a Quaker goat rancher in Tucson, Arizona, who assisted 
Central Americans in crossing the U.S. border unlawfully.138  Federal 
officials routinely forced asylum-seekers, who lacked legal assistance, 
to sign voluntary departure forms, which led to their deportation back 
to Central America.139  Corbett therefore sought to facilitate access to 
asylum by connecting with the Manzo Area Council in Tucson and 
forming the Tucson Ecumenical Council Task Force on Central 
America (TEC), both of which aided refugees detained by 
 
deportation, and coercing them to accept “voluntary departure.”  The court issued a 
temporary injunction against the INS. See Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 
351, 354 (C.D. Cal. 1982).  In 1988, the court issued a permanent injunction against 
the INS. See Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488, 1505 (1988); see also 
Susan Bibler Coutin, Falling Outside: Excavating the History of Central American 
Asylum Seekers, 36 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 569, 574 (2011). 
 133. President Reagan and GOP allies in Congress considered Central Americans 
in the 1980s, specifically those fleeing Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Honduras, not as refugees welcomed under the Refugee Act of 1980, but rather, as 
economic migrants who unlawfully entered the U.S. and were subject to removal.  
See Coutin, supra note 132, at 576. 
 134. GARCIA, supra note 88, at 99. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See id. at 99–100. 
 137. Chinchilla et al., supra note 116, at 106–07. 
 138. GARCIA, supra note 88, at 98. 
 139. See PIERRETTE HONDAGNEU-SOTELO, GOD’S HEART HAS NO BORDERS: 
HOW RELIGIOUS ACTIVISTS ARE WORKING FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS 144–45 (2008). 
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Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) at the border by 
posting bonds for their release, offering legal assistance in 
deportation hearings, and preparing asylum applications.140 
On June 26, 1981, Corbett had taken three Salvadoran refugees 
into the Tucson INS office to apply for political asylum, with the 
understanding that INS allowed asylum applicants to go free while 
their applications were being reviewed, if they were under the custody 
of a local minister.141  William Johnson, Tucson INS director, instead 
ordered them to be arrested and set their bail at $3,000 each, a 
significant increase from previous bail amounts.142  Moreover, INS 
director Johnson said that he was under orders from the State 
Department not to grant asylum to Salvadorans and that all 
applicants in the future would be arrested and sent to El Centro, the 
local jail.143  Realizing that he was unable to work with INS directly to 
fight for asylum under federal law, Corbett turned to a strategy of 
grassroots resistance.144  This incident sparked the church sanctuary 
movement.145 
Corbett approached members of the Tucson community, including 
Southside Presbyterian minister John Fife, about building up a local 
network of safe houses, and began building contacts in Mexico to 
provide temporary housing and help aid in the illegal transportation 
of refugees across the Mexico-U.S. border.146  In November 1981, the 
Church voted in favor of serving as a safe house for Central American 
refugees.147  A few months later, in January 1982, Southside voted 
fifty-nine to two in favor of becoming a sanctuary by secret ballot, 
which shielded sanctuary workers from the anti-harboring provision 
of federal immigration law.148  As part of its moral resistance to 
federal policy, Southside set March 24, 1982 as the date they would 
publicly declare themselves a sanctuary.149  This date was symbolic 
because it was the second anniversary of the assassination of Oscar 
Romero, Archbishop of San Salvador and vocal critic of U.S. refugee 
 
 140. Id. at 144; see CHRISTIAN SMITH, RESISTING REAGAN: THE U.S. CENTRAL 
AMERICA PEACE MOVEMENT 64–65 (2010). 
 141. SMITH, supra note 140, at 64. 
 142. See id. 
 143. Id. at 65. 
 144. See GARCIA, supra note 88, at 98. 
 145. SMITH, supra note 140, at 59–86. 
 146. Id. at 98–99. 
 147. Id. at 99. 
 148. Id. at 67, 99; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1982) (establishing that bringing in, 
transporting, and harboring aliens in the United States is a violation of the law). 
 149. GARCIA, supra note 88, at 99. 
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policy.150 This choice linked the church’s declaration of sanctuary to 
an international movement opposing U.S. foreign policy, because 
Romero was a visible figure who urged Presidents Carter and Reagan 
to end their military aid to the Salvadoran army, which he considered 
to be responsible for the civil war.151 
An effective sanctuary movement required a network of safe 
houses across the United States and international borders.  Corbett 
and task force members sent “Dear Friend” letters152 to 
congregations and over five hundred Quaker meetings throughout 
the country, asking them to join the movement. Corbett wrote: “if 
Central American refugees’ rights to political asylum are decisively 
rejected by the U.S. government or if the U.S. legal system insists on 
ransom that exceeds our ability to pay, active resistance will be the 
only alternative to abandoning the refugees to their fate.”153  
Between January and March 1982, five churches in Berkeley, 
California, and a few churches in Los Angeles, California, 
Washington, D.C., and Lawrence, New York, agreed to declare 
sanctuary.154  In addition to the growing church sanctuary movement, 
activists placed pressure on federal officials to change their asylum 
policy towards Central Americans.  In a letter to U.S. Attorney 
General William French Smith, Fife explained: 
We take this action because we believe the current policy and 
practice of the US government with regard to Central American 
refugees is illegal and immoral.  We believe our government is in 
violation of the 1980 Refugee Act and international law by 
continuing to arrest, detain, and forcibly return refugees to terror, 
persecution, and murder in El Salvador and Guatemala.155 
Meanwhile, Tucson sanctuary leaders contacted media outlets to 
spread their statement against federal policy nationwide and to make 
the March 24 sanctuary declarations a national event.156 
The movement took on a new national presence in 1982 when the 
Chicago Religious Task Force on Central America (CRTFCA) joined 
 
 150. See id. at 20–23. 
 151. See id. at 21. 
 152. SMITH, supra note 140, at 63 (explaining that Corbett wrote a series of “Dear 
Friend” letters to over five hundred Quaker meetings explaining the plight of the 
refugees and criticizing INS practices of deporting refugees without legal counsel). 
 153. Id. at 63–64. 
 154. Id. at 67; GARCIA, supra note 88, at 99. 
 155. GARCIA, supra note 88, at 99. 
 156. Id. 
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and took over coordinating efforts to grow the movement.157 In 
addition to coordinating the transportation and placement of refugees 
at churches and houses throughout the United States, the Chicago 
Task Force printed and distributed various “nuts-and-bolts” manuals 
for sanctuary organizers with detailed instructions on every phase of 
the process and how to use it as a political tool.158  While church 
sanctuaries were decentralized and local in nature, the Chicago Task 
Force provided organization and a strategic roadmap for growing the 
number of churches from Southwestern to Midwestern states.159 
By early 1983, there were forty-five sanctuary churches and 
synagogues throughout the country and six hundred secondary 
sanctuary groups that endorsed the movement but were not actively 
involved in harboring.160  This increased to 150 churches by mid-1984 
with eighteen national religious denominations and commissions 
endorsing the movement.161  In 1985, 250 churches declared sanctuary 
and the Central Conference of American Rabbis endorsed the 
Sanctuary movement, including its civil disobedience strategies.162  By 
1985, the movement had also grown from secular institutions to 
include universities and state and local governments.163 
2. Moral Activism Evolves into Federalism Conflict Over Policy 
Concurrent to their grassroots efforts, sanctuary leaders built up a 
national coalition with U.S. Senators and Representatives in states 
that directly experienced the rise of Central American asylum seekers 
and where church sanctuaries had formed.  Congressional leaders 
spearheaded efforts to reform national policy, first through pressuring 
the White House to grant Central Americans “extended voluntary 
departure,” followed by passing legislation to provide “temporary 
protected status.”164  Sanctuary activism evolved into two distinctive 
national policy areas.  On foreign policy, activists connected the 
international Central American Peace Movement through their 
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 159. See id. 
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Democratic Congressional allies to pressure President Reagan’s 
administration to end its policy of U.S. military involvement and aid 
in Central America.165  On federal law, activists merged their local 
sanctuary cause with ongoing bipartisan efforts to pass 
comprehensive immigration policy.  Until 1985, activists saw federal 
law as a viable and ideal option, but repeated failure to change 
presidential policy or pass legislation led them to reconsider local and 
state sanctuary policies. 
The first federal reform effort began in April 1981.  Representative 
Ted Weiss (D-NY), joined by 31 sponsors, introduced HR 126, 
“expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that extended 
voluntary departure status should be granted to El Salvadorans in the 
United States whose safety would be endangered if they were 
required to return to El Salvador.”166  One year later, Senator Dennis 
DeCocinni (D-AZ), introduced a Senate version of the resolution, SR 
336, to the Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy, 
along with co-sponsor Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY).167  
The two non-binding Congressional resolutions were a display of 
Democratic support for the sanctuary movement, with the goal of 
pressuring President Reagan to grant early voluntary departure 
(EVD) status to Salvadoran asylum seekers.  Democratic allies of the 
sanctuary movement called on the Secretary of State, after passing 
the resolutions, to recommend to the Attorney General that asylum 
seekers from El Salvador be granted EVD status.168 
Reagan responded in 1981 by creating a Task Force that not only 
recommended the administration to continue resisting EVD, but also 
warned Reagan of the “demographic consequences” of Latin 
American immigration.169  Representative John Joseph Moakley (D-
MA) sent letters to President Reagan in 1982, challenging the 
President to change his policy on El Salvador.  He referenced a 
United Nations Human Rights Commission report, estimating that 
over 9000 political murders had occurred in El Salvador in 1981 
alone, and called U.S. foreign policy “unconscionable.”170  All non-
 
 165. See GARCIA, supra note 88, at 93; SMITH, supra note 140, at 92. 
 166. H.R. Res. 126, 97th Cong (1981). 
 167. S. Res. 336, 97th Cong. (1982). 
 168. GARCIA, supra note 88, at 96. 
 169. Id. at 203 n.28. 
 170. Letter from John Joseph Moakley, Member, House of Representatives, to 
Ronald Reagan, President of the United States (Feb. 1, 1982) (on file with Suffolk 
University, Moakley Archive & Institute, Series 03.04 Legislative Assistant Files: Jim 
McGovern, Box 1 Folder 1 (shelf locator)). 
522 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVI 
binding efforts to pressure President Reagan into changing his stance 
failed, causing Democratic allies of the sanctuary movement to 
change strategy. 
After failing to change presidential policy, Senator DeConcinni 
and Representative Moakley introduced House Resolution 822 and 
Senate Bill 377 in 1985, both asking for Congressional review of the 
crisis and to grant Salvadoran asylum seekers temporary stay of 
deportation.171  DeConcinni and Moakley’s legislative efforts were 
not put up for a vote, but they were able to add EVD to the omnibus 
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA).172  However, IRCA 
passed without a solution to the refugee crisis because President 
Reagan threatened to veto the bill in 1985 if a provision allowing for 
EVD status to Central Americans was not removed.173  This further 
exacerbated the refugee crisis.  The newly enacted immigration law 
created federal sanctions on employers for hiring undocumented 
workers, an amnesty program for undocumented immigrants who 
entered the country prior to January 1, 1982, a guest worker program, 
and funding for border enforcement.174  Since the majority of Central 
Americans arrived in the United States after 1982, this made them 
ineligible for amnesty and employment in the United States.175 
Concurrent to the federal reform efforts, city governments with 
direct ties to church sanctuary began to get involved.  On June 7, 
1983, Madison, Wisconsin passed the first city resolution commending 
the local St. Francis House and associated congregation “for their 
compassion and moral courage in providing sanctuary to refugees 
from El Salvador and Guatemala.”176  The following year, in response 
to an immigration raid conducted by INS, San Jose, California moved 
to limit local officials including law enforcement from partnering with 
INS on raids or enforcing immigration laws.177  The sanctuary policy 
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movement spread and peaked in 1985, with eighteen cities in ten 
different states.178  Between 1985 and 1987, four states passed a form 
of state-wide sanctuary that ended their cooperation with INS 
investigations or arrests of Central American refugees, pledged their 
support for the church moral sanctuary movement, and supported the 
end goal of national reform.179  By the end of 1987, twenty-eight cities 
enacted sanctuary policies, some of which enacted more than one 
policy.180 
 
 
 
 
 
The growing federalism conflict explains the timing of this spread 
in local government sanctuary policies.  It was a response in cities and 
states where church sanctuary were visible and INS raids were 
conducted, fueled by federal inaction on the refugee crisis and federal 
prosecution of sanctuary workers.  In San Jose’s motion, the city 
council refers to the possibility that the Immigration Reform Act of 
1984 would provide national amnesty to Central Americans, but the 
provisions added by Senator DeConcinni and Representative 
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Moakley were removed in 1986 under Reagan’s threat to veto the 
bill.181 
The federal government also began to prosecute and criminally 
charge church sanctuary workers for illegally transporting and 
harboring Central Americans.  The INS led a year-long covert 
investigation called Operation Sojourner from 1984 to 1985, where 
informants worked undercover with Arizona-based church 
sanctuaries in order to gather evidence and details about the 
workers.182  This operation led to the Tucson Trials in January 1985, 
where U.S. prosecutor Donald Reno successfully blocked all evidence 
relating to defendants’ religious and humanitarian motives, U.S. 
foreign policy, human rights abuses, and the asylum process.183  This 
ruling prevented the defense team from arguing that the sanctuary 
workers were aiding Central Americans in accessing asylum, and the 
court considered only their role in transporting and harboring illegal 
immigrants.184  The federal prosecutor portrayed the sanctuary 
movement as a “criminal venture” rather than “church-based 
ministry.”185  This fueled church activists to turn their moral cause 
into a federalism conflict rooted in city sanctuary policies that were 
shielded under the Constitution. 
3. Shared Features of Sanctuary Policies 
In the 1980s, state and local sanctuary policies shared many 
features.  They highlighted the United States’ obligation to help all 
refugees under the Refugee Act of 1980, made explicit solidarity with 
churches and private citizens’ sanctuary movements, and connected 
sanctuary to America’s national heritage.  The primary change that 
occurred from church sanctuary, which was largely underground in 
operation but highly publicized as a moral opposition to federal 
policy, was that government sanctuary policies at the state and local 
levels directly resisted enforcement of federal immigration law by 
limiting its capacity.  Unlike church sanctuary, government sanctuary 
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was considered a constitutionally legitimate form of resistance where 
government officials could provide services and aid to undocumented 
residents without the same threat of federal prosecution that was 
placed over church sanctuary workers. 
Most city sanctuary policies included provisions prohibiting city 
employees and departments from requesting or sharing information 
on immigration status, and from using legal immigration status as a 
condition for receiving municipal benefits.  Berkeley, California’s 
1985 resolution encouraged residents of the city to “work with the 
existing sanctuaries to provide the necessary housing, transportation, 
food, medical aid, legal assistance and friendship” to Central 
Americans.186  Its policy also barred city officials and employees from 
partnering with INS to enforce federal immigration law and barred 
them from interfering in the work of church sanctuaries or provision 
of public services to “Central American refugees.”187  Similarly, 
Chicago’s 1985 executive order encouraged “equal access by all 
persons residing in the City of Chicago, regardless of nation of birth 
or current citizenship, to the full benefits, opportunities and services, 
including employment and the issuance of licenses, which are 
provided or administered by the City of Chicago.”188  It also stated 
that “[n]o agent or agency shall request information about or 
otherwise investigate or assist in the investigation of the citizenship or 
residency status of any person,” and that “[n]o agent or agency shall 
disseminate information regarding the citizenship or residency status 
of any person.”189  A few cities, including Duluth, Minneapolis, and 
Ithaca, New York, included requests that the INS notify advocacy 
organizations of any arrests of Central Americans made within their 
city.190 
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The significance of government sanctuary policies for the 
immigrant populations went well beyond severing local officials and 
resources from enforcing federal immigration law.  They began to 
address issues of inequality and discrimination, and they expanded 
access to resources and public benefits.  Sanctuary often meant an 
expansion of belonging by including all immigrants, regardless of 
their legal status.  The policies also began to recognize the 
constitutional rights of immigrants, which would become much more 
pronounced in the second (1996–2018) and third (2001–2005) periods 
of sanctuary policy development.191 They alleged that the federal 
government violated the plaintiffs’ (the arrested sanctuary workers) 
First Amendment right to freely exercise their religion by infiltrating 
churches during Operation Sojourner, making the sanctuary workers’ 
arrests unlawful.192  They also alleged that the federal government’s 
discriminatory adjudication of Central Americans’ requests for 
asylum violated their Fifth Amendment rights.193  The ABC case 
lasted six years before it was settled January 31, 1991, marking 
another important national victory for the sanctuary movement by 
reopening nearly 150,000 asylum cases and letting over 100,000 more 
Central Americans apply for new decisions.194 
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca marked the first national success of the 
sanctuary movement, holding that an asylum applicant only needs to 
demonstrate a “well-founded fear” of persecution, which made the 
asylum process for Central American applicants more equal to that of 
applicants from other countries.195  The Immigration Act of 1990 
included a provision by Representative Moakley that offered 
eighteen months of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to Salvadoran 
refugees and made them eligible to apply for asylum after TPS 
ended.196  That same year, the federal government officially “agreed 
[to] stop detaining and deporting most [undocumented] immigrants 
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from El Salvador and Guatemala and to adopt new procedures for 
their applications for political asylum.”197  The Nicaraguan 
Adjustment and Permanent Central American Relief Act of 1997, 
which granted legal permanent residency to Nicaraguans and other 
foreign nationals so long as they were registered asylum seekers 
residing in the U.S. for at least five years since December 1995, 
marked the culmination of the sanctuary movement’s effort to reform 
U.S. policy by granting Central American refugees a pathway to legal 
permanent residency.198 
The enactment of sanctuary policies had generally died down as a 
result of reforms to the asylum process through I.N.S v. Cardoza-
Fonseca and federal reform to immigration law in 1990.  After 1987, 
most new sanctuary policies were enacted by cities that had already 
passed a policy.  Chicago passed a second executive order in 1989 that 
mirrored the provisions on equal access and non-enforcement of 
immigration law made in its first order in 1985.199  Similarly, New 
York City’s Mayor Koch issued a second executive order in 1989 that 
reaffirmed his 1985 order prohibiting city officials and employees 
from providing information to INS about immigration status, with the 
exception of immigrants who had criminal records.200  Somerville, 
Massachusetts revised its 1987 sanctuary policy in 1989, adding a 
specific reference to the stalled federal bill, House Bill 618, proposed 
by its very own Congressman Moakley, which asked for an in-depth 
Government Accountability Office study of the conditions in Central 
America, especially in El Salvador, and urged Congress to apply the 
report’s findings in future policy reforms.201 
San Francisco passed multiple policies in the 1980s and 1990s in 
response to federal enforcement in the city, which expanded 
sanctuary in important ways.  Its 1985 policy declared its support for 
church sanctuaries, made it clear that immigration law is a matter of 
federal and not local jurisdiction, and urged city officials and 
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employees not to discriminate based on immigration status, nor 
“jeopardize the safety and welfare of law-abiding refugees by acting 
in a way that may cause their deportation.”202  Its 1989 policy went 
much further, declaring that “No department, agency, commission 
officer or employee . . . shall use any City funds or resources to assist 
in the enforcement of federal immigration law” and placed the city’s 
Human Rights Commission in charge of overseeing compliance with 
the sanctuary policy.203  Three years later, in 1992, San Francisco 
passed a third sanctuary policy highlighting that immigration raids 
and enforcement continued to be a problem for the city.204  It 
reaffirmed its sanctuary policies and added a requirement for the city 
police department and county sheriff’s department to provide a 
report to the city about its implementation of the policy and any 
persons they have reported to INS.205 
B. Period 2: 2001–2005: Sanctuary from the Patriot Act 
The spread of sanctuary policies between 2001 and 2005 neither 
focused on federal immigration law, nor intended to protect 
undocumented immigrants.  Our dataset reveals that Period 2 is 
composed of 361 city government policies that far outnumber the 
cumulative 265 city government policies protecting Central American 
refugees and undocumented immigrants in the first and third periods 
combined.206  The large number of sanctuary policies emerged in a 
short span of time in part because of bipartisan local resistance 
movements against the federal government’s local orientation in 
fighting terrorism after September 11, 2001.207  The Patriot Act 
threatened citizens and non-citizens alike with federal surveillance 
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and local enforcement initiatives.208  Republican and Democratic 
states and cities across the country responded by enacting similar 
sanctuary policies as the 1980s, but tailored them towards resisting the 
Patriot Act.209  Some protected only U.S. citizens, while others 
protected all residents including undocumented immigrants, but the 
vast majority used vague language of protecting all local residents 
without the mention of citizenship or legal immigration status.210 
 
 
 
 
 
In the months after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Congress unilaterally 
passed the Patriot Act with bipartisan support, with provisions that 
gave local law enforcement the ability to bypass alerting suspects of 
impeding warrants or searches, and providing them easier access to 
warrants to search businesses and business records.211  This raised 
deep constitutional concerns over the rights of citizens and non-
citizens alike.  The Patriot Act also sought to increase information 
sharing between local law enforcement and federal government 
agencies and to enhance surveillance technology to fight against 
online threats.212 
Unlike the 1980s, the local response to the Patriot Act was not 
fueled by a church movement in the beginning.  States and cities 
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across the country responded with pressure to change federal law and 
passed 361 local government sanctuary policies from 2001 to 2005.213  
The robust and quick spread of sanctuary policies was the result of a 
bipartisan movement and national crisis, mainly over the Tenth 
Amendment, but with profound implications for the constitutional 
principles that underpin all sanctuary laws. 
1. Constitutional Issues Raised in Sanctuary Policies 
The Patriot Act raised a number of fundamental concerns over 
safeguarding Fourth and Fifth Amendment constitutional rights.214  
Minority groups, especially undocumented immigrants, were 
particularly vulnerable after 9/11 due to the government’s expansion 
of immigration law by making it a powerful criminal justice tool and 
vehicle for expanding federal and local partnerships to apprehend, 
incarcerate, and deport noncitizens with criminal convictions and 
suspected terrorists.215  It is important to note that the blurring of 
immigration enforcement and anti-terrorism efforts began much 
earlier, when the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) were passed in 1996.216  AEDPA and 
IIRIRA together “criminalized” immigration law and set up the legal 
foundation for the Patriot Act to expand federal power in the interior 
of the country, marking a major shift in American federalism.217 
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Formed in 2001, the Civil Liberties Task Force of the ACLU 
spearheaded the Bill of Rights movement across states and 
localities.218  On the one hand, state governments were unclear as to 
whether the Patriot Act had fundamentally altered federalism to 
empower the federal government to deputize local law enforcement, 
or worse, to mandate these partnerships.219  The traditional outward-
looking role of the federal government was increasingly being turned 
inward to counter acts of terrorism.220  Concerns about federal 
encroachment on state power were combined with concerns about 
protecting individual civil liberty and due process, which led to 
sanctuary policies passed from 2001 to 2005 specifically referencing 
the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments.221 
In 2003, a proposed Domestic Security Enhancement Act (DSEA) 
was leaked to the public and fueled the major spread of local 
sanctuary policies, which grew from 23 policies passed in 2002, to 216 
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Municipal Bill of Rights Resolutions After the Passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, 
114 AM. J. SOC. 1716, 1721 (2009). 
 219. See Susan Herman, Introduction to Trager Symposium: Our New Federalism? 
National Authority and Local Autonomy in the War on Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 
1201, 1225 (2004). 
 220. See id. at 1205–06. 
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protections: First Amendment (right to the establishment of religion, freedom of 
speech, peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of 
grievances), Fourth Amendment (right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, and protection from 
warrantless arrest); Fifth Amendment (right to not be compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against himself); Sixth Amendment (right to a speedy, fair trial, 
amongst a public jury and with legal counsel); Eighth Amendment (right to not be 
subject to cruel and unusual punishment); Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment (right to 
due process and equal protection rights regardless of citizenship or immigration 
status). Minutes from the Peace and Justice Commission Regular Meeting, City of 
Berkeley (Nov. 2, 2003), 
https://www.cityofberkeley.info/Commissions/peaceandjustice/2003peaceandjustice/p
df/110303M30.pdf [https://perma.cc/2C8L-RMFN] [hereinafter Peace and Justice 
Commission Minutes].  Most of the sanctuary policies included similar constitutional 
references.  Colbern, Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author). 
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policies passed in 2003.222  The bill went beyond the Patriot Act’s 
expansion of federal counterterrorism powers through FISA 
surveillance warrants, criminalizing materials supporting terrorism, 
and enhancing discretionary powers of law enforcement to remove 
unauthorized immigrants.223  Massive resistance at the local level, 
through sanctuary policies, was paired with a large bipartisan 
opposition in Congress that quickly defeated DSEA from even being 
proposed in the House or Senate.224  The newly formed coalition of 
conservative and progressive members of Congress turned their 
attention to amending provisions of the Patriot Act that threatened 
privacy and civil liberties, and led an education campaign in the 
House and Senate to ensure that reauthorization of the Patriot Act 
would better protect constitutional rights.225  With sunset provisions 
in the Patriot Act set to expire in 2005, the second period of sanctuary 
policy development had ended.226 
2. Shared Features of Sanctuary Policies 
Progressive cities like Berkeley, Santa Cruz, and Ann Arbor 
specifically crafted their resolutions to protect all residents, including 
non-citizens such as refugees and immigrants.  Their sanctuary 
resolutions referred to specific provisions of the Patriot Act as 
infringing on civil liberties guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and 
detailed the local government’s commitment to the rights of all 
people.227  The language provided by Berkeley’s sanctuary policy 
 
 222. Timothy Scahill, Comment, The Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003: 
A Glimpse into a Post-Patriot Act Approach to Combating Domestic Terrorism, 38 
JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 327, 328 (2004); Colbern, Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra 
note 103 (on file with author). 
 223. See Scahill, supra note 222, at 346. 
 224. Id. at 341. 
 225. Id. at 341 n.99; see also USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization 
Act of 2005, H.R. 3199, 109th Cong. (2005), https://www.congress.gov/bill/109th-
congress/house-bill/3199 [https://perma.cc/RK9K-P3XM]. 
 226. The Patriot Act’s “sunsets” are provisions that expire unless Congress re-
authorizes them, which included Title II, the main vehicle permitting federal 
authorities to surveil, monitor and investigate Americans with fewer constitutional 
checks on abuse like warrants.  While most of these sunsets were extended under 
reauthorization bills, the bipartisan sanctuary coalition largely dissolved by 2005 and 
civil liberty groups re-focused in national reforms to the U.S. Patriot Act.  Scahill, 
supra note 222, at 337 (drawing the connection between the local sanctuary 
movement and US Patriot Act sunset provisions). 
 227. Berkeley’s Resolution states that “the PATRIOT Act, directives from 
Attorney General Ashcroft, and particular executive orders seem to target foreign 
nationals and people of Middle Eastern and South Asian descent, and anyone who 
may legally speak or act to oppose government policy,” and then goes on to state 
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from this period illustrates its distinctiveness from the first and third 
periods, making no mention of immigration law.  Instead, its focus 
was on the detention of citizens and non-citizens under the Patriot 
Act and the deep constitutional concerns raised by interior 
enforcement related to anti-terrorism, including: 
. . . freedom of speech, religion, assembly and privacy; the rights to 
counsel and due process in judicial proceedings; and protection from 
unreasonable searches and seizures, all of which are guaranteed by 
the Constitution of California, the United States Constitution and its 
Bill of Rights, and by United Nations Charter Article 55.228 
Like Berkeley, California’s policy, 361 policies enacted between 2001 
and 2005 do not mention immigration law and were focused 
exclusively on the Patriot Act.229 
Given the bipartisan nature of this second period of development, 
a clear trend emerged in which progressive cities included all 
residents or specifically referred to Muslims and immigrants, who 
were targeted under the Patriot Act and by vigilante groups after 
9/11.230  Meanwhile, resolutions passed in more conservative 
jurisdictions used language in their policies limiting sanctuary to 
violations of the rights of U.S. citizens.231  On October 7, 2003, for 
example, Princeton Borough, New Jersey, enacted a sanctuary policy 
referring to “the imperative to protect the fundamental rights and 
liberties of the American people,” with no mention of immigrants or 
other minorities.232  This policy’s narrow focus on citizens helps to 
illustrate that sanctuary policies are not exclusive to undocumented 
immigrants, nor are they merely a type of resistance to federal law.  
Sanctuary provides a vehicle for cities to advocate for their residents’ 
 
that, the “City of Berkeley includes a diverse community of students and working 
families, including non-citizens, whose contributions to the community are vital to its 
character and function.” See Peace and Justice Commission Minutes, supra note 221. 
See also Ann Arbor City Council, Res. R-295-7-03, 2003 (Mich. 2003); City Council 
of the City of Santa Cruz, Res. NS-26,032, 2002 (Cal. 2002); Colbern, Sanctuary 
Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author). 
 228. Peace and Justice Commission Minutes, supra note 221; Colbern, Sanctuary 
Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author). 
 229. Colbern, Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author). 
 230. Id.; see, e.g., City Council of the City of Seattle, Res. 30578, 2003 (Wash. 
2003). 
 231. Colbern, Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author). 
 232. Press Release, ACLU, ACLU of New Jersey Commends Princeton for 
Passage of Pro-Civil Liberties Resolution (Oct. 8, 2003), https://www.aclu.org/press-
releases/aclu-new-jersey-commends-princeton-passage-pro-civil-liberties-
resolution?redirect=cpredirect/17708 [https://perma.cc/32TM-DHWJ]; see Colbern, 
Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author). 
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constitutional rights, and the policy’s level of inclusiveness is directly 
shaped by the city’s relationship with its residents, including citizens, 
legal immigrants, and undocumented immigrants. 
One year later, on October 12, 2004, the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security’s Bureau of Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (BICE) gave the Princeton Borough Police Department 
notice that they were going to conduct an immigration raid to arrest 
and detain undocumented immigrants.233  During the raid, BICE 
officers presented themselves as police officers, which created 
mistrust between immigrant residents and local officials and police.234  
Responding to the federal immigration raid, Princeton Borough 
passed another sanctuary policy, this time expanding its language to 
be inclusive of all residents.235  Notably, while the policy still refers 
specifically to the Patriot Act, it added that “the Borough of 
Princeton is comprised of immigrants from throughout the world who 
contribute to Princeton’s social vigor, cultural richness, and economic 
vitality,” and it emphasized that the city “respects the rights of and 
provides equal services to all individuals, regardless of race, ethnicity, 
national origin, or immigration status.236  This change from 2003 to 
2004 by Princeton Borough helps to illustrate how sanctuary policies 
emerge and evolve.  Specific developments in federal law and 
interactions with federal law enforcement raised constitutional 
concerns that altered the city’s protection of its citizens and 
immigrants alike. 
At least ten jurisdictions enacted more than one sanctuary policy 
between 2001 and 2005, often as a response to specific events that 
sparked increased resistance.237  Twenty-six sanctuary policies were 
enacted that focused specifically on federal immigration law, with five 
simultaneously focusing their opposition toward the Patriot Act.238  
This meant that the second (2001–2005) and third (1996–2018) 
 
 233. Res. 2004-R271 (Borough Council of the Borough of Princeton, N.J. 2004); 
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see Colbern, Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author). 
 235. Res. 2004-R271 (Borough Council of the Borough of Princeton, N.J. 2004); 
see Colbern, Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author). 
 236. Res. 2004-R271 (Borough Council of the Borough of Princeton, N.J. 2004); 
see Colbern, Sanctuary Policy Dataset, supra note 103 (on file with author). 
 237. More than one policy was enacted in: Washington, D.C. (2003, 2005); 
Philadelphia (2002, 2003); Seattle (2002, 2004, 2005); San Francisco (2002, 2005); 
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periods of sanctuary policy development were not entirely 
disconnected, but they were very much distinct.  The overlap between 
the second and third periods included 361 policies focused only on 
opposing the Patriot Act.239  Federal law after 9/11 had a profound 
impact on increasing the immigration enforcement power of federal 
and local officials, but federal immigration law itself was not the core 
concern mobilizing local resistance.  The ACLU’s Bill of Rights 
Movement was not connected specifically to the cause of resisting 
immigration law enforcement.240  Meanwhile, immigrant advocacy 
organizations were almost entirely focused on national level reforms 
in immigration law, not sanctuary, until 2006.241  Moreover, the 
second movement focused on the Patriot Act was led by bipartisan 
groups and officials, at a time when partisanship divides were being 
forged over immigration. 
C. Period 3: 1996–2018 Sanctuary from Immigration Law 
Directly following the first period (1979–1995), a few cities passed 
sanctuary policies highlighting the harsh new immigration laws 
enacted by the federal government in 1996.  Denver’s policy in 1998 
referenced the fundamental shift in federal law that denied legal 
immigrants from being able to access federal public benefits, and 
made it clear that this change was detrimental to its “children, senior 
citizens, and disabled residents” and fostered a “climate of 
intolerance and discrimination.”242  Similarly, Austin passed a 
resolution in 1997 referencing federal welfare reform and defended 
immigrant residents by stating that such residents generally were not 
dependent on welfare or public social services.243  While new 
jurisdictions joined the sanctuary movement after 1995, it was not 
until 2006 that the movement began to gain new momentum in 
response to harsh proposals for reforming federal immigration law. 
Beyond the Patriot Act, the events of September 11, 2001 changed 
the course of immigration.  Officials and news anchors debating 
immigration replaced “border security” with the term “border 
control” to emphasize the counter-terrorism link to immigration 
 
 239. Id. 
 240. Vasi & Strang, supra note 218, at 1721. 
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enforcement.244  This provided a new political frame for 
restrictionists245 to push for harsh immigration laws at the national, 
state, and local levels.  The timing of policy enactments in 
immigration federalism, in terms of the activism for restrictive and 
pro-immigrant policies at the state and local levels, illustrates the 
distinction between the second and third sanctuary periods.  
Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan trace the spread of policies as 
occurring in two waves across states and localities, with anti-
immigrant policies spreading first, from 2004 to 2012, and pro-
immigrant policies spreading much later, after 2010.246  Thus, while 
scholars have generally referred to the timeline of sanctuary as a 
single spread of policies beginning in 2001, insights from immigration 
federalism scholarship point towards a sanctuary movement with a 
distinctive focus on federal immigration law after 2005.247 
The restrictionist wave that ushered in a new era of immigration 
federalism is rooted in key political actors that redirected 
policymaking away from the national level and towards the state and 
local levels.  Kris Kobach led this effort of redirecting restrictionists 
to state and local policy.248  In 2002, while working in the Department 
of Justice, Kobach authored a memo seeking to change the DOJ’s 
enforcement policy so that local police could make arrests for civil 
violations of immigration law, which was soon adopted by the Office 
of Legal Counsel.249  A few years later, in 2004, Kobach turned his 
sights on convincing major national organizations like FAIR and 
NumbersUSA, who had previously led in pushing for harsher federal 
immigration laws, to begin pushing anti-immigrant laws at the state 
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and local levels of government.250  FAIR’s legal wing, the 
Immigration Reform Law Institute (IRLI), began working together 
with Kobach to influence states like Arizona and localities like 
Hazelton, Pennsylvania, with legal counsel and model restrictive 
legislation.251 
Arizona’s Proposition 2000, the “Arizona Taxpayer and Citizen 
Protection Act,” was one of the first anti-immigrant laws passed in 
2004, kick-starting the restrictive wave of policies.252 FAIR had 
funded the signature-gathering campaign and then pushed the courts 
in the state to enforce the law broadly.253  The law changed voter 
registration in the state by requiring residents to prove U.S. 
citizenship prior to registering to vote and banned undocumented 
immigrants from access to public benefits by requiring state and local 
agencies to use strict identification standards that checked for legal 
immigration status.254  It also mandated that state and local officials 
report violations of federal immigration law, and made it a 
misdemeanor to not follow state law in reporting such violations.255  
State laws grew exponentially, from fifteen in 2005, to forty-nine in 
2006, and ninety-eight in 2007 — most of which were restrictive in 
nature and modelled after one another.256 
1. Immigrant Rights Origin of Sanctuary Policy 
The year 2005 marks a critical moment not just for the decline of 
the Second Sanctuary Period’s policy development, when certain 
provisions of the Patriot Act reached their sunset, but also for the 
immigrant rights movement.  The Border Protection, Antiterrorism, 
and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005 (H.R. 4437), also called 
the Sensenbrenner bill, was a harsh federal law that sought to 
criminalize both unlawful presence in the country and associating 
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with any person inside the country who was unauthorized.257  Section 
202 of H.R. 4437 imposed criminal penalties on anyone who “assists, 
encourages, directs, or induces a person to reside in or remain in the 
United States . . . knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that 
such person is an alien who lacks lawful authority to reside in or 
remain in the United States.”258  Under this section of the law, “an 
American citizen child living with undocumented parents” would be 
subject to criminal penalties for “assisting” their parents to “reside in 
or remain in the United States.”259  Criminalizing U.S. children for 
being born and living with their immigrant parents escalated the 
immigration debate and immigrant rights movement.  H.R. 4437 
passed the House but was defeated in the Senate.260  The extreme 
nature of the immigration debate in 2005 and harsh measures in the 
proposed bill led to deep fissures across party and demographic lines, 
and sparked the immigrant rights movement.261 
Immediately following the failed attempt by Republicans to push 
through H.R. 4437, coordinated mobilizations occurred across the 
country, with an estimated 5 million people marching in over 300 
demonstrations in 2006 alone.262  Immigrants and their allies used 
these demonstrations to place pressure on Washington, D.C. to move 
towards a bipartisan reform to immigration law that would provide 
undocumented immigrants a pathway to citizenship.263  In May 2006, 
the U.S. Senate proposed S. 2611 which included a pathway to 
citizenship, as the alternative to H.R. 4437 that sought to criminalize 
U.S.-born children.264  A standstill over the pathway to citizenship 
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between the Senate and House bills prevented comprehensive 
immigration reform from succeeding.  Immigration federalism 
scholars explain that, while 2005 had mobilized demonstrations on a 
national scale, the immigrant rights movement and funders were 
largely focused on reforming federal law.265 
The spread of sanctuary policies focusing on immigration law were 
directly connected to the debate happening in Washington, D.C. at 
the time.  These policies were mostly symbolic declarations of support 
to immigrants and a strong signal to national officials of cities’ 
positions on federal reforms.  This first peak in policies was far 
smaller than what emerged after 2013, with immigration reform 
failures under President Obama, and was more symbolic in nature.  
Los Angeles, California, was the first city to pass a sanctuary policy in 
2006, which was a symbolic policy to show the city’s opposition to 
H.R. 4437 in the U.S. Senate, stating: 
WHEREAS, H.R. 4437 could have a potential discriminatory 
impact because it would establish a mandatory eligibility verification 
system, expanding the voluntary “Basic Pilot” program that is 
currently available nationwide which would require a mandatory 
verification system to check a job applicants’ immigration status. 
This will dramatically impact documented and undocumented 
workers and U.S. citizens alike, which could consequently disrupt 
the economy.266 
Los Angeles’s 2006 resolution did not change the city policy, but 
merely served to voice its opposition to the harsh federal bill up for 
consideration in U.S. Congress.  It had already limited its 
enforcement of federal immigration law through the police 
department’s Special Order 40 in 1979 and the city’s sanctuary policy 
in 1985.267 
Over the next two months, four cities passed similar resolutions to 
oppose H.R. 4437.268  On March 8, 2006, Boston passed a resolution 
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that made its support for reform that would benefit undocumented 
immigrants very clear, declaring “its strong support for 
comprehensive immigration reform that combines a path to 
permanent status for immigrants already here and wider legal 
channels for those coming in the future with humane and effective 
enforcement at our borders.”269  Soon after, San Francisco enacted a 
resolution in support of the “Secure America and Orderly 
Immigration Act” (S. 1033 and H.R. 2330), which were bipartisan 
bills by Senator John McCain and Senator Edward Kennedy that 
provided a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants.270 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On March 1, 2007, San Francisco became one of the first cities after 
2005 to legally resist entangling local law enforcement with 
immigration law.271  The Office of the Mayor issued an executive 
order that reaffirmed its 1980s status as a sanctuary city, stating: “No 
department, agency, commission, officer or employee of the City and 
County of San Francisco may assist Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) investigation, detention or arrest proceedings,” 
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nor “require information about or disseminate information regarding 
the immigration status of an individual when providing services or 
benefits.”272  A few policies mirroring San Francisco spread across the 
country from 2007 to 2011, after which a new focus on resisting 
immigration detainer requests began to define the sanctuary 
movement.273 
In 2008, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security created a new 
collaborative information program, Secure Communities (S-Comm), 
that effectively co-opted local law enforcement and jails into 
automatically providing the federal government information on all 
arrested individuals.274  The program was slowly rolled out over six 
years on a county-by-county basis, dramatically increasing in 2012 and 
completed nationwide in 2013.275  When S-Comm first began to 
spread across the country, the National Day Laborer Organizing 
Network (NDLON) led the growing immigrant rights movement in 
how to resist through model-legislation.276  Sanctuary policies 
emerged that prevented local law enforcement from entering into 
287(g) agreements or honoring ICE detainer requests.277  These 
sanctuary policies were very effective in constraining local law 
enforcement from honoring ICE detainer requests and decreasing 
deportations.278 
Madison, Wisconsin passed a policy on June 1, 2010 that continued 
to urge the city’s police department to “continue its current practice 
of not entering into Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA) agreement with ICE” and asked the: 
County Sheriff’s Office to end its current practice of contacting ICE 
at booking time for all cases involving processing of non-US citizen 
jail inmates and instead more narrowly tailor its policy by contacting 
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ICE only for non-US citizen inmates who are being held on a 
possible felony charge.279 
Aided by NDLON, Santa Clara County, California, passed a 
resolution in 2010 preventing local officials and resources from 
investigating, questioning, apprehending, or arresting any person for 
immigration purposes.280  The following year, it enacted a much more 
specific policy limiting local law enforcement from honoring ICE 
detainer requests.281  Over the next few years, anti-detainer sanctuary 
policies began to spread across cities and counties, and local law 
enforcement agencies began to issue similar sanctuary policies as 
public statements or official department policies. 
A robust state and local pro-immigrant policy movement was 
underway by 2010 and 2011, fueled by the failure of the federal 
DREAM Act in 2010.282  California in particular was the front-
runner, passing laws to grant financial aid to undocumented workers 
in 2001,283 limiting the use of the federal E-Verify in 2011,284 granting 
driver’s licenses for DACA recipients in 2012 and for undocumented 
residents in 2013,285 and passing a range of other integration and 
sanctuary measures.286  In 2013, California passed the Transparency 
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and Responsibility Using State Tools (TRUST) Act, providing that 
officers can only enforce immigration detainers issued by ICE for 
persons convicted of serious crimes.287  In 2014, when California’s 
TRUST Act went into effect, the city of San Francisco and counties of 
Contra Costa, Alameda, and San Mateo announced that they would 
no longer cooperate with any ICE detention requests of possible 
unauthorized immigrants in local jails.288  California’s state and local 
sanctuary policies resulted in a major decrease in deportations by ICE 
after 2014 and caused President Obama, under the direction of 
Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson, to end S-Comm that same 
year.289  Democratic control of the state, and partnerships between 
officials and immigrant rights organizations, have paved the road for 
California to expand its sanctuary-type protections exponentially 
since 2014, including passing the TRUTH Act in 2016 and Values Act 
in 2017.290 
2. Sanctuary as More than Resistance-Only 
Immigration federalism had a profound impact on where sanctuary 
policies were emerging.  California cities were responsible for the 
enactment of 33% of the 108 sanctuary policies from 2014 to 2018.291  
California police and sheriff’s departments were responsible for 27% 
of the 147 sanctuary policies enacted during this same period.292  In 
both cases, city government and local law enforcement policies built 
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on and cited California’s state laws, often passing new laws in order to 
align local policy with state policy.  Our dataset shows similar patterns 
in the sanctuary policies of other states and localities as well.  For 
example, local government and law enforcement policies spread after 
Connecticut’s TRUST Act passed in 2013,293 after Illinois’s TRUST 
Act passed in 2017,294 after Oregon’s sanctuary policy passed in 
2017,295 and after New Jersey’s Governor issued his executive order 
in 2018 reversing the state’s stance to “pro-sanctuary.”296 
Understanding state-level patterns in enacting sanctuary policies is 
critical for understanding the nature of resistance through sanctuary 
policies in the Trump era, as policy expansions emerged in 2017 
mostly in states like California, Massachusetts, and Illinois.297  While 
Trump-era politics may have fueled new states and cities to enact 
sanctuary policies for the first time, a pro-immigrant policy movement 
at the state and local level had laid the constitutional groundwork for 
sanctuary policies.  Post-2017 sanctuary policies were part of a two-
decade movement to reform federal law to provide a pathway to 
citizenship for all undocumented immigrants.  Within this movement, 
sanctuary policies developed in direct response to harsh federal bills 
that denied this pathway, as well as harsh immigration enforcement 
through S-Comm from 2008 to 2014.  By the time President Trump 
took office in 2017, immigrant rights organizations in progressive 
states had issued blueprints outlining their policy successes on 
immigrant rights and protections that could be used by jurisdictions 
beginning to build a more welcoming state or city for immigrants.298  
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This history reveals that sanctuary policies crafted from immigrant 
rights movements were far more than a resistance to President 
Trump. 
III. A HOLISTIC FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING SANCTUARY 
POLICIES 
Reconsidering sanctuary policies as three distinctive periods of 
development provides legal, empirical, and theoretical advantages.  
Our periodization scheme contributes a more nuanced set of cases for 
analyzing causal relations between sanctuary and crime.  The holistic 
framework reconciles the intricacies of social movements with legal 
movements, by analyzing them through distinct periods in the 
evolution of sanctuary policy. 
Diverse areas of scholarship have treated sanctuary policies as a 
single development that originated in 1980 and continues to evolve 
today.  Yet, federal laws over the past four decades have changed 
dramatically, thereby shaping the ways in which sanctuary policies are 
constructed.  Immigrant rights movements have also evolved and re-
structured sanctuary policies to better resist the federal government 
and uphold constitutional rights.  Indeed, a range of sanctuary 
policies are now emerging from states, counties, cities, local law 
enforcement agencies, churches, and colleges, as a reaction to the 
federal push for local immigration enforcement and to the 
increasingly restrictive immigration policies of the federal 
government. 
This Article provides an important synthesis of typological-legal, 
historical-legal, historical-moral, and policy-data approaches to 
studying sanctuary, to show that sanctuary is much more than a 
resistance movement.  Importantly, it establishes a framework that 
identifies three sanctuary periods, which track federal and sanctuary 
laws through three significant moments in U.S. history. It also 
consolidates the creation of immigrant-rights and church-based 
movements.  Importantly, this Article recognizes an important truth: 
Social movements underpin the specific legal and constitutional 
principles that make sanctuary policies a cornerstone for immigrants’ 
rights. 
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CONCLUSION 
After the President’s anti-sanctuary executive order was issued in 
January 2017, Santa Clara filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, 
arguing that “the Executive Order has created a cloud of financial 
uncertainty so overwhelming that it irreparably harms the Country’s 
ability to budget, govern and ultimately provide services to the 
residents it serves.”299  Santa Clara was not alone.  Four other cities 
filed lawsuits challenging the executive order.300  On April 25, 2017, a 
federal judge joined the Santa Clara and San Francisco motions, 
ruling that the executive order likely violated the Spending Clause by 
removing federal funding from sanctuary jurisdictions and ordered a 
nation-wide preliminary injunction.301  On August 1, 2018, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in City and County of 
San Francisco v. Trump, lifted the nation-wide injunction and allowed 
President Trump’s anti-sanctuary order to go into effect.302 
Importantly, the Ninth Circuit preserved the injunction on the 
executive order for California, because the court considered there 
was sufficient evidence of federal intent to injure the state and its 
localities.303  According to the Ninth Circuit, “the district court noted 
that California and its cities, especially San Francisco, were visible 
targets of the Administration’s intent to defund sanctuary 
jurisdictions.”304  It then found that there was not sufficient evidence 
that other states and localities would be similarly targeted and injured 
in order for a nation-wide injunction to be justified.305  Despite the 
federalism conflicts they raise, sanctuary policies stand on deep 
constitutional grounds, which is why California remains shielded from 
 
 299. See Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 23–24, County of Santa Clara, No. 
17-cv-00574 (N.D. Cal Feb. 3, 2017); see also Lai & Lasch, supra note 1. 
 300. See generally Complaint, City & County of San Francisco v. Donald J. Trump, 
275 F. Supp. 3d 1196 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2017) (No. 3:17-cv-00485); Complaint, 
County of Santa Clara v. Donald J. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 
2017) (No. 5:17-cv-00574); Complaint, City of Chelsea & City of Lawrence v. Donald 
J. Trump (D. Mass. Feb. 8, 2017) (No. 1:17-cv- 10214); Complaint, City of Richmond 
v. Donald J. Trump, 2017 WL 6945397 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2017) (No. 3:17-cv-01535); 
Complaint, City of Seattle v. Donald J. Trump, 2017 WL 4700144 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 
29, 2017) (No. 2:17-cv-00497). 
 301. See County of Santa Clara v. Donald J. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497 (N.D. Cal 
2017) (order granting the County of Santa Clara’s and City and County of San 
Francisco’s Motions to Enjoin Section 9(a) of Exec. Order 13768). 
 302. See City & County of San Francisco v. Donald J. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1231 
(9th Cir. 2018). 
 303. See id. at 1344–45. 
 304. Id. at 1238. 
 305. See id. at 1244. 
2019] FORDHAM URB. L.J. 547 
the executive order.  Consistent with the Ninth Circuit ruling, the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of California 
denied a motion to strike down California’s TRUST Act, stating that 
the state sanctuary law was not an “obstacle” to federal 
enforcement.306  California’s former State Senator and leader on 
immigrant rights, Kevin de León, responded to the ruling to uphold 
sanctuary, stating: “California is under no obligation to assist Trump 
tear families apart.”307  Current litigation has upheld sanctuary 
policies’ constitutional legitimacy. 
As this Article shows, President Trump’s narrative that sanctuary 
policies violate federal law and challenge core American values 
ignores their critical place in American history.  Sanctuary policies 
became less connected to the specific struggles of Central American 
refugees and assumed broader goals related to civil rights and 
immigrant rights that span the basic functions of state and local 
governance.  Sanctuary today provides a moral and constitutionally 
legitimate form of integration and protection with regard to 
undocumented residents. 
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